Soviet anti-ship torpedo steam-gas 53-56V - a new generation underwater weapon

Caen Arsenal case

JSC Machine-Building Plant named after S.M.
Kirov" did not raise an international scandal about "counterfeit spare parts produced by "***. In general, there was some kind of strange story with this spare parts. In accordance with the contract, 251 sets of spare parts were manufactured. The certificate of completion of work was signed by the acting head of the naval underwater weapons and weapons service of the Russian Navy, Vitaly Garmashov. He was also responsible for distributing spare parts to the fleet. However, in 2011, all arsenals disrupted the implementation of the state order for the recertification of 53-65K due to... a lack of spare parts. The apogee was the so-called “Kan case”, initiated by the deputy head of the military investigative department for the Krasnoyarsk garrison, Major Khalyavin, in August 2011.

In 2010, Northern Arsenal OJSC received a government contract for the repair of 70 products (33 combat and 15 practical torpedoes 53-65K and 22 self-propelled mines 2510). The director of the Northern Arsenal, Semenov, entered into a contract for repairs with the 10th Arsenal of the Navy in Kansk. The terms of the contract provided for the repair of torpedoes using spare parts. However, the arsenals never received it. Instead, they used expired spare parts, although in the acceptance certificate they wrote: “Spare parts, raw materials and materials used during the work are certified with unexpired shelf life...”

...The investigation established the unsatisfactory technical readiness of the workshop and equipment of the Kan arsenal for the work. Instead of the average repair of torpedoes, a “test of the functioning of products”, not provided for by any regulatory documents, was carried out - by ear and eye (in the literal sense of the word: arsenal employees explained that, for example, they check the performance of the torpedo engine gearbox by ear, and to measure the axial clearances there were no measurers). Hydraulic testing of the repaired products (in an autoclave) was not actually carried out, although in the technical passports “this work was reflected as completed.” (Novaya Gazeta has a resolution to initiate a criminal case.) According to regulatory data, in one month one enterprise can repair from 5 to 7 products, working in one shift. To repair one torpedo, 470-500 standard hours are required (for mines - 422 n/h). Employees of the Kan arsenal set a world record by repairing 70 torpedoes and mines in just a month and a half, spending an average of 77 n/h on each product. That is, 6.2 times faster than the standard. In this case, the mines were not even removed from the container, they simply applied the necessary markings and sealed the containers with new seals. The weapon recertified in this way was received with a bang by military acceptance and was to be put into service by the navy.

...A year later, when loading weapons onto a submarine at the Pacific Fleet, an emergency situation occurred: the oxygen torpedo “leaked.”

Before being delivered to the carrier, the weapon must undergo strict incoming control of the mine and torpedo services in the fleets. Most of the Arsenal defects can usually be identified and “neutralized.” At the Pacific Fleet, the incoming inspection stage turned out to be ineffective. Perhaps because the torpedo “leaked” after all the checks. The cause of the emergency situation became clear quickly: during repairs, a rubber gasket was installed in the torpedo tank instead of a paronite gasket. It is difficult to imagine the consequences if a torpedo began to poison the oxygen on a submarine during combat service.

The best anti-torpedo in the world. Because she's the only one so smart

Complex "Package E/NK". Caliber – 324 mm. Length – 3.1 m. Weight – 400 kg. Explosive substance in TNT equivalent - 80 kg. Travel speed – up to 25 m/s. Travel range – up to 1400 m.

This is a torpedo.

Let us say right away that the product is not new - it was first shown at the exhibition back in 2007. But since then this weapon has received further development. Not long ago, it was tested with updated capabilities, primarily intellectual ones. Tests have confirmed that it has no analogues in the world - neither in properties nor in capabilities. This was confirmed in his interview with the Izvestia newspaper by the chief designer of the State Research and Production Enterprise Region (part of the Tactical Missiles Corporation) Konstantin Drobot.

Product of the First World War?

Those who understand will immediately ask: is this a torpedo from the First World War? Do you want to sink a warship with 80 kg of warhead? A target destruction zone from 100 to 800 meters – what is this even about?

Nevertheless, it is a torpedo. Only with the prefix “anti”. That is, according to all the main characteristics, it is a torpedo. But the main purpose is to kill enemy torpedoes. And also – in the process – those who will launch them.

The problem is this. The current torpedoes in the world's fleets have greatly outstripped the capabilities of ships to protect against them. This, frankly, does not apply at all to the Russian fleet, where, as the sailors admit, things are not going well with torpedo armament. There are Shkval missile-torpedoes, which brighten up the situation to the best of their ability, but overall there really isn’t a satisfied smile.

But in general, the torpedo “sword” really surpasses the capabilities of the “shield”. It’s enough just to imagine what a ship can oppose to an underwater “shark” with a homing head, which attacks it from a distance of 50 km and sticks half a ton of explosives in the TNT equivalent into its bottom. Moreover, it often has the ability to “screw” into the body and explode inside.

"Squall". Photo: www.globallookpress.com

And what can a ship do against this? Only constructive anti-torpedo protection for the ship - roughly speaking, so that smaller compartments are less likely to flood. And rocket launchers - for example, the Udav-M1 complex - with a probability of disrupting the attack of a straight-line torpedo of 0.9, and a homing one - 0.76. This is very good - after all, the adversary launches more than one torpedo at a time...

On the torpedo - anti...

And this is what Konstantin Drobot said. The E/NC Package complex is, first of all, a system. An automated system for solving problems of anti-torpedo protection, which itself detects an attacking torpedo, itself makes calculations of its course, itself gives target designation and itself launches. The explosive “pike” itself - by the way, is in fact of a completely standard caliber, which is used by ships, submarines, and especially anti-submarine defense aircraft and helicopters - is only part of this complex.

It includes a hydroacoustic target designation station, launchers and the weapons themselves. Moreover, there are two types of them - the anti-torpedo itself and just an ordinary small-sized torpedo. Visually they are indistinguishable from each other. The launch containers are also the same. The system operates autonomously according to the “fire and forget” principle. A person is only required to have permission to work for the purpose.

The complex became, in fact, a universal weapon: they discovered a torpedo, destroyed it, started searching for the boat, found it, destroyed it,

– Konstantin Drobot succinctly formulated.

Photo: shaineast / Shutterstock.com

The West is again in the role of catching up

As already mentioned, Russia has been playing catch-up for a long time in terms of torpedo armament. And in terms of small-caliber torpedoes, it was generally seriously inferior to foreign competitors. So, the E/NK Package complex not only eliminated this backlog, but also far surpassed them in a number of characteristics. Although Russia’s competitors here are the USA, England, Italy, France.

But, as Drobot says, today competition has moved to a different plane - in the field of artificial intelligence, software, and countering artificial and natural interference. At the same time, what is important, it is possible to replace the software without disassembling the product. That is, for an anti-torpedo to be super-modernized and again ahead of its competitors, nothing needs to be replaced from the hardware, but rather it is enough to change the operating system. Quite a remarkable property.

“Will the appearance of your products encourage further development of torpedoes by foreign colleagues?” – Izvestia author Alexey Ramm rightly asks.

“Of course, the development of technical thought cannot be stopped,” you can see how the designer shrugs his shoulders. – It is possible that foreign engineers will take the path of improving their torpedo weapons. But we won’t stand still.”

The next stage of development has already been determined. The current complex is designed for surface ships. And now on the agenda is adapting it to solve the same problems on a submarine.

But in any case, one thing is clear. The development of the “E/NC Package” complex today does not seem to be a successfully solved, but isolated task. The list of weapons in which Russia has surpassed the whole world and continues to improve is becoming longer. And everything is more complex.

Development history

In December 1926, after the transfer of the Lessner plant to the Ostekhburo, its restoration and preparation for production began. The first serial products of the plant, which, by the way, received a new name “Engine” in November 1927, were 53-27 torpedoes. Unfortunately, not everything went smoothly. From 1927 to 1930, only 52 torpedoes were manufactured. The design imperfections of the project and the low quality of manufacturing of the torpedoes constantly led to complaints from the fleet. The main disadvantage of the torpedo was that, due to its short range, it could be used almost only from submarines and torpedo boats. For surface ships, its range was clearly short. In addition, the torpedo was poorly controlled in depth and did not have sufficient tightness. And yet its production continued. In 1934, the plant produced 850 53-27 torpedoes: 629 for submarines and 221 for surface ships.

Monitoring of the serial production of torpedoes, as well as all research and development work carried out in the field of torpedo production, was carried out at that time by the Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) of the Red Army Navy. In 1932, these functions were transferred to the newly created Scientific Research (1938-1948 - Scientific Testing) Mine and Torpedo Institute (NIMTI) of the Navy.

The torpedo-making industry was also created almost anew. It was created in record time. By the end of the 30s, torpedoes were already being produced at four factories: in Leningrad and im. K. E. Voroshilov, in Bolshoy Tokmak near Dnepropetrovsk at and at the newly built in 1938 plant near Makhachkala (later “Dagdizel”), the delivery of torpedoes to the fleet was carried out by three sighting stations: near Leningrad on Lake Kopanskoye, in the Crimea near Feodosia and on Caspian Sea.

Steam-gas torpedo 53-38: A - warhead; B - training head; 1 — explosive material of the combat charging compartment; 2 - inertial fuses with ignition cups; 3 - air tank; 4 - water compartment; 5 — oil cylinder; 6 — kerosene cylinder; 7 — hydrostatic device; 8 — heating apparatus; 9 — cylinder of the main machine; 10 — steering gear; 11 - connecting rod-crank and distribution mechanisms of the main machine, enclosed in a crankcase; 12 — Aubrey device; 13 — tail section with depth and direction rudders, two propellers

The primary task of Soviet torpedoists was to modernize the 53-27 torpedo. First of all, it was necessary to introduce a second long-range speed mode for surface ships. For this purpose, a pressure regulator, a heating apparatus, a hydrostat and a number of other mechanisms borrowed from a 53F torpedo purchased in Italy in 1932 were used. The modernized torpedo was put into service in 1936 and became known as 53-36. Alas, the torpedo turned out to be no better or more reliable than its predecessor. In terms of its performance characteristics, it still lagged behind foreign models. After multiple modifications, the fleet managed to deliver only about a hundred 53-36 torpedoes. However, they also had to be used with great restrictions. In 1938, the failed model was discontinued. What could torpedo designers do when the fleet was in dire need of modern torpedoes? Just turn again to the Italian samples purchased in 1932. There were two of them - caliber 450 mm and 533 mm. NIMTI was entrusted with organizing the reproduction of Italian torpedoes at domestic factories. Soon the working drawings were ready and in 1936 he began manufacturing 45-centimeter torpedoes. They began to be called 45-36N. The letter "N" meant that the torpedoes were intended primarily for Novik-class destroyers. Of the 53-centimeter submarines, they could be used through plug-in grilles. In 1938, and from 1939 on the Dagdizel, 53-centimeter torpedoes began to be produced. They were intended for surface ships and submarines with 53 cm caliber devices. The torpedoes were named 53-38.

21

53–65K. Features of national torpedo development

To the team of the Machine-Building Plant named after. S. M. Kirova

DEDICATED

Melt down the wax, but save the honey

Kozma Prutkov

One autumn day in 1963, a meeting was held in the office of the head of the Navy Directorate on Bolshoi Komsomolskoye. In the office were its owner Boris Dmitrievich Kostygov, torpedomen Mikhail Borisovich Rosenshtein, Grant Migranovich Akopov and guests from the Alma-Ata plant: director Pyotr Kharitonovich Rezchik, head of the plant's design bureau sector Daniil Samuilovich Ginzburg and military representative Pyotr Kuzmich Kolyadin. This was not a chance meeting, but a planned one. It was prepared by Mikhail Borisovich Rosenstein. At this time, he was known as one of the ideologists of the Office on almost all issues, and there were good reasons for this. During the war, he was called up for military service from the post of director of a torpedo factory, carried out, and always successfully, orders for the evacuation of enterprises and their commissioning in new places. Therefore, he knew everything and everyone in the mine and torpedo industry. The upcoming conversation was intended mainly for Kostygov. He, of course, was also aware of the matter, but had not yet made the final decision. This was not an easy question.

The conversation took place between Carver and Kostygov. First, as usual, about the weather in Moscow and Kazakhstan, factory affairs, difficulties in fulfilling the production plan, and then switched to the main issue - the oxygen torpedo 53-56, the brainchild of the plant's design bureau. With the adoption of the 53–61 hydrogen peroxide torpedo into service in 1961, the time came to decide which type of energy to give preference to: “oxygen-kerosene” or “hydrogen peroxide-kerosene”. At that time, there were two samples of both types in service: oxygen 53–56 and 53–58 and hydrogen peroxide 53–57 and 53–61. There was another one in development. Its Chief Designer, Dmitry Andreevich Kokryakov, intended to achieve a speed of about 70 knots and, thus, assign priority to peroxide torpedoes. It should be noted that oxygen torpedoes were simpler to operate. The most undemanding were, of course, aerial steam-gas torpedoes 53–51, but their life was ending. However, let's not get ahead of ourselves. The aerial torpedoes were in no hurry to give up their positions. The percentage of torpedoes using strong oxidizers in the ammunition load of fleet ships was still small, and the practical firing plan was carried out mainly using steam and gas torpedoes. With them there were fewer worries, and the result was better. However, let's return to Kostygov's office.

— It’s a pity to abandon, Boris Dmitrievich, the production of this oxygen torpedo. Great experience in operation and production. Relying only on peroxide torpedoes is not entirely correct. Kokryakov promises to get 70 knots, but this is still “a chicken in the nest.” So it seems to us that it would be advisable to modernize the 53–56 torpedo. Deep modernization.

— What does “deep modernization” mean?

— Create a new sample.

- No. No need for a new sample. We have enough new ones. And we can talk about modernization. The torpedo does not have a homing system. The optical proximity fuse also did not catch on. Not a fuse, but a travel suitcase.

— We know that the 53–56 torpedo has many disadvantages, but you can’t take away the positives either. Oxygen is not hydrogen peroxide. Oxygen facilities at naval bases are quite developed.

— What performance characteristics do you hope to get? Speed? Range?

— The advantages of the new torpedo will not be in performance characteristics, but in reliability. And it will be as simple as a revolver cartridge. I now have smart guys in the OKB - they can move mountains.

The carver nodded at Ginzburg, who was sitting next to him.

- Here is one of them, and also Barybin, Morozov, Kazakov, Nadtochiy, Shcherbachenko. I can’t list them all. They have an idea.

- I wonder what the idea is?

“The fact is that each of the torpedoes manufactured by the plant has two or three impeccably run-in units. So they propose to take the most reliable nodes as a basis:

oxygen path and hydrostatic apparatus from torpedoes 53–56;

instead of a piston engine - a turbine and aft compartment from a peroxide torpedo 53–57;

combat charging compartment with homing equipment and a proximity fuse from a peroxide torpedo 53–61;

the practical charging compartment is also from 53–61. Then finalize the whole thing. What's it like?

— It’s better to take an optical homing system. She's on her way. Next year we will adopt them. — It was Mikhail Borisovich Rosenstein who entered the conversation and briefly reported on the progress of testing the homing equipment:

- We can take the optical one too. The main thing for us, Boris Dmitrievich, is your agreement in principle and funding, of course.

— You, Pyotr Kharitonovich, still haven’t answered my question, what performance characteristics will we have?

Here the author of the idea, Daniil Samuilovich Ginzburg, entered the conversation.

- Boris Dmitrievich! The torpedo will be single-mode. The speed is about 45 knots, the range is about 20 km. This is what can be obtained using kerosene-oxygen steam on currently existing turbines. We are not an institute, but a factory. We either already know how to make all the components of a torpedo ourselves, or we can obtain them through established cooperation. We do not require any preparation for production. We are confident that we will cope with the task in a short time.

We were silent. It was felt that Rosenstein and Akopov had long agreed with the plant’s proposal. Kostygov hesitated:

— A torpedo with a speed of 70 knots at the same range is in development. How will the Mine and Torpedo Institute react to this idea? Central Research Institute "Gidropribor"?

Rosenstein understood Kostygov’s doubts:

- Boris Dmitrievich! Opening a new topic: developing a torpedo with such performance characteristics - they won’t understand us. Let the plant run on its own. We will estimate the terms of reference for the modernization of the 53–56 torpedo here. Akopov and Ginzburg will think about the financing procedure. It seems to me that we should agree with the plant’s proposal...

Kostygov thought for a couple more minutes and nodded his head. The plant received the consent in principle from the management of the ordering department, after which work in the plant’s design bureau began to boil. In addition to those mentioned by the plant director in Kostygov’s office, designers E. N. Gormina, V. M. Zikeeva, A. B. Shubina, A. M. Chukanova, I. B. Krivulina, R. S. Popora were connected to her. technical documentation was developed, and the production of the material part began, as soon as the drawings, still warm from the hands of the designers, were removed from the drawing boards. Less than a year had passed before three practical torpedoes were ready and they were rolled out of the walls of the assembly shop for loading to be sent to the sighting station. Solemn moment! The head of the workshop, Vladimir Petrovich Erokhov, personally supervised the loading of torpedoes. The chief engineer of the plant, Joseph Efimovich Kravtsov, decided to go to organize tests at a test site in Kyrgyzstan, on Lake Issyk-Kul. Deputy director V. F. Zubrilin, planner G. T. Basenov, and technologist M. S. Ezhkov came to look at the brainchild of the plant. The meeting was not a rally, but a celebration took place. Everyone was sure that the torpedoes would go straight away and they were not mistaken. The torpedo began to confidently turn kilometers on its propellers, and three months later a report with the positive results of the first stage of factory testing was presented to the head of the Navy's control department, to the Mine Torpedo Institute and the Central Research Institute "Gidropribor".

The Mine and Torpedo Institute frowned:

“We didn’t issue technical specifications, we didn’t participate in the tests, and in general this is some kind of homemade product!” Kokryakov already has almost 70 knots in his pocket. Why do we need this 45 knot torpedo?

Experienced employees of the institute diplomatically objected:

- But the work was carried out with the consent of Kostygov himself!

- Well, what does Kostygov have to do with it? He is now the Deputy Chief of Naval Armaments! And in the UPV Ignatiev and Pukhov. Now let them sort it out.

The only person at the institute who spoke out in support of the development was captain 2nd rank Mikhail Khaimovich Bersudsky. He and Topolyansky created the 53–56 torpedo and now jealously but benevolently followed the successes of others on “their” field.

The Central Research Institute "Gidropribor" also treated the test report with disdain:

- Let's see how their torpedo is aimed at the target!

Firing a torpedo during factory tests with an optical homing system really diminished the enthusiasm: the torpedo was poorly aimed at the target. The homing system turned out to be practically inoperable - it had to be put on a shelf. 1967 was the black year of the oxygen torpedo. The work was in danger of being closed.

Meanwhile, Ko Kryakov completed testing his torpedo. He achieved a speed of about 70 knots, but the reliability of the torpedo’s power section was extremely low. Explosions of energy components were noted at the travel distance, burnouts of steam and gas generators, and popping noises in pipelines. Nevertheless, it was accepted into service and even awarded the Lenin Prize. The torpedo's speed of 70 knots had a mesmerizing effect on everyone: the Americans were bypassed! Everyone thought that reliability was a gain. By that time, the Americans had not yet landed on the Moon and the time for concern had not yet arrived. However, Kokryakov’s success in achieving high speed did not eliminate other problems, but, on the contrary, added them. The torpedo community was pestered not only by the reliability of thermal torpedoes, but also by the large number of samples. There were indeed too many anti-ship torpedoes. Try, ensure their preparation and operation. How many preparation posts and torpedo crews do you need to have in a MTCH? Therefore, at the next gathering of miners, it was clear that one of those who serve on the rock farthest from Moscow on the farthest sea would stand up and say...

Mikhail Borisovich Rosenstein, sensitive to the mood of the audience, casually threw in an idea:

— Why do we need to have a wide variety of torpedoes using strong oxidizers for practical firing? Maybe we should have a reliable aerial steam-gas torpedo?

The people fell silent in surprise: they heard right, after all, this is a step back, even two. And then, having already weighed all the pros and cons, he remained silent diplomatically - there would be fewer problems with providing combat training. Not everyone knew that during this period an aerial steam-gas torpedo was developed for export. At first, small batches of these torpedoes under the mysterious name 53–56В settled in the torpedo workshops of the fleets. The torpedo turned out to be excellent in all respects. Everyone was delighted. An aerial steam-gas torpedo began the second conquest of the fleet. The name of the torpedo is quite modern - a modernization of the oxygen torpedo. She looks like her too. They also sent combat torpedoes to the fleet. The tension temporarily subsided. But only temporarily. The process of operating thermal torpedoes with strong oxidizers was reminiscent of off-road driving: if you pull out the tail, the nose will get stuck, or vice versa. Either the antifreeze fails, or the rubber cuffs fail, or the metal cracks. “We need a single model of torpedoes using strong oxidizers,” Akopov thought, returning again and again to the thought of the fate of the oxygen torpedo. Before closing the topic, he decided to once again listen to the direct performers of the work and invited Ginzburg, Bersudsky, and Kolyadin to Moscow. The military representative's opinion was brief:

— Grant Migranovic, the result could have been completely different. Homing equipment was imposed on us here at UPV. If you take the equipment from Kokryakov, there will be no price for the torpedo. Look how she walks!

He didn’t have to tell Akopov this. He himself saw from the reports that the torpedo was simpler and more reliable than all the previous ones. He intuitively felt that she was a gift from fate. It was sent to us from above to be a single anti-ship torpedo. Its development must be completed at all costs and put into service under the code 53–65K as a modernization of 53–65. It is unlikely that we will be able to improve the reliability of the Kokryakov torpedo. Akopov again listened to what the experts were convincing him of.

— Grant Migranovich, the work cannot be closed. We need to go to Pukhov and convince him...

- And I’m not going to close it. But we need an unconventional move from you. A visit to Pukhov will yield nothing. Currently, the fight against multi-topics has unfolded. He was ordered to launch a fight against multi-topics, and he is launching it. We need your reasoned appeal to Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov. Moreover, the work is carried out according to the plan of the Commander-in-Chief. Everything will be natural. So they say and so, we have good results. It takes a year and a half to complete. We will have a simple, reliable and cheap torpedo. It's not for me to teach you. You know how to spell out your promises. And we will support you. I take it upon myself. Now let's go underground. While the letter is going back and forth, correct the documentation, replace the homing equipment. Then Professor Boris Aleksandrovich Ryabov and his specialists came to me from the Aviation Institute. They propose to modify the control system - add an angular velocity sensor. If this is necessary, then outline the technical specifications for them. I'll connect.

...After reading the letter from a group of designers from the design bureau of the Almaty plant, Sergei Georgievich began to think. Such letters addressed to him are not uncommon. You can send all this for conclusion to the Scientific and Technical Committee. Then they will ask for the opinion of the Navy Directorate, those of the Mine and Torpedo Institute, those... It seems that this is a different case. These inventors have probably already been everywhere and want to get either his approval, or... he re-read the last paragraph again - about manufacturability, simplicity, low cost. I remembered the war... “This is a torpedo for war,” thought the Commander-in-Chief. And he began to print “APPROVE.” This is how the future 53-65K torpedo received its first pass to the fleet. From the Commander-in-Chief. Personally.

The Commander-in-Chief's decision did not bring any more friends to the torpedo. The institutes continued to pretend that they were not aware of the matter, they did not know and had not heard of the development of a new oxygen torpedo. “It's not scary. - thought Akopov, - the main thing is that they don’t interfere with work, don’t write... We have fighters for justice - almost, what’s wrong - a letter to the very top without a signature.” But everything was quiet.

The torpedo was born under a lucky star. Assembled by the talented hand of Ginzburg from the best units and assemblies that were then in production for thermal torpedoes, optimized in terms of the consumption of energy components for the time being for range firing conditions, the torpedo confidently turned kilometers on its screws. Now with a homing system.

The telephone on Akopov’s desk began to ring with long-distance ringing:

- Grant Migranovic! Kolyadin reports on Ginzburg. Not a product, but a piece of candy. Walks like a clock. Guides like a beast. It's time to go to State tests.

- Work, work...

Grant was not solving a simple problem. It’s time to report to Pukhov that his instructions to close the work with this torpedo have not been carried out, but... it’s not easy to report to your boss that you turned out to be wiser and more far-sighted. We must somehow find a way out of the situation... especially since the boss loves to invent, and even more so to receive rewards, and here is a new field of activity - from head to tail. Soon the opportunity presented itself, as if by order...

A telegram from the Pacific Fleet signed by Brodsky: “We consider the fleet’s mastery of the 53-65 torpedo to be inappropriate due to the extreme complexity of its preparation...” First, of course, you will need to report the good news. For example, this telegram from Almaty: “Having considered your proposals to improve the reliability of torpedoes 53–61, I inform you that they have been accepted for implementation. Acts of implementation have been sent ref...” Akopov called the “chief inventor” Yulian Dashkov and showed the telegram:

- We need to assemble a commission...

- We'll collect it. How much for whom?

— He’s 200, I’m 50. Pick a couple more people. For registration.

- Understood…

... Pukhov swung his signature on the money sheet and put the money in the side pocket of his jacket.

- Sit down, Grant, what else do you have? Isn’t that why you’re coming to me so early?

- Yes, Alexander Grigorievich, you are right. Brodsky refuses to master the 53–65 torpedo. He writes that it is complex and unreliable. Here is the telegram from ZAS.

- This Brodsky again! The smart guy has been found! Everything is wrong for him! I cut off his oxygen wherever I could. It's climbing again.

- Or maybe he’s right? There is good news. Oxygen torpedo in Almaty on its way out.

“Well, we killed her two years ago.”

“They cut it down, but didn’t destroy it,” Grant smiled slyly, “and it wasn’t a bad torpedo...

Akopov reported all the details. Pukhov was silent for a long time, digesting the information:

— How do our scientists greet a torpedo?

- “Gidropribor” doesn’t even want to hear about it. We don't know anything! Ours don’t recognize either. Khurdenko says that he did not sign any technical specifications and is generally not aware of the matter.

- Well, what about Kokryakov and Topolyansky? They will howl.

- If we encourage you, they won’t howl.

- Fine. And we will deal with Khurdenko. Connect Bersudsky from the serial department. She and Ginzburg will come to an agreement.

— He has been sitting in Almaty for a long time. By the way, I instructed him to study the possibility of introducing your ideas into the torpedo.

- Yes, sure. What do they understand about torpedoes? And we’ll connect Gidropribor later - they won’t get away from us. True, it is not easy to get laureates here. Are you not a laureate yet?

- Not yet.

- Well, a cash bonus is not bad either! Pukhov grinned... - Give me your torpedo for State tests. Prepare a joint decision.

The torpedo was born under a lucky star. Scientific institutes are categorically against it, and the torpedo spins and spins for kilometers. State tests passed with flying colors.

The chief designer of the torpedo, Daniil Samuilovich Ginzburg, was not a disruptive person. Quiet, modest, intelligent and, finally, always sober, he gave in to powerful vocal cords and, at times, agreed even with what he fundamentally disagreed with. And as for the confidential conversation with management, he generally nodded his head in understanding. So, for “higher reasons”, the torpedo was not adopted by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR or even by order of the Minister of Defense. It was simply put into mass production by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Like some kind of exercise machine or power supply.

When signing the order to launch the torpedo into series, the Commander-in-Chief remembered the appeal of the torpedo designers to him. So everything is fine. Now the Commander-in-Chief did not sign the torpedo a pass to the fleet, but gave it a permanent registration. For many years. But no one received any orders, medals, or prizes. Not the same “level”, although the quality is higher.

The torpedo hit the fleet. The beginning, as always, was not easy. It has its own conditions and its own problems. But it turned out that the torpedo had a lot of friends in the navy - it was simple, technologically advanced and reliable.

Deputy Chief Designer Evgeniy Matveevich Barybin, researcher Mikhail Khaimovich Bersudsky and military representatives Viktor Nikolaevich Kostyuchenko and Yuri Petrovich Golovan are not leaving the fleets. They teach naval torpedoists to prepare torpedoes for firing. They shoot it from all classes of ships.

Innovators and inventors in production are like cockroaches on ships! And where do they come from? And it cannot be said that this made the torpedo better. Quite the contrary. And in the Pacific Fleet it jerked so hard that the chairs of the high-ranking torpedomen swayed. It worked out.

The torpedo began to confidently gain its position in the fleet.

Time has passed. By the 1980s, the 53–65K oxygen torpedo had become practically the only anti-ship torpedo in the Navy. The time has come for universal torpedoes. However, once occupied by the tubes of torpedo tubes of ships, ranging from torpedo boats to nuclear-powered ships of the first generations, the 53–65K torpedo was not inferior to its competitors. More than one generation of torpedo crew specialists was replaced in the fleets, workers in factories and officials in offices. There is already the fourth chief in the UPV - Butov. There are new people almost everywhere. And then Daniil Samuilovich Ginzburg decided...

“Listen, Grant,” he turned to Akopov during his next visit to Moscow, “you’ll retire soon.” They've already assigned you a new deputy. We should do a good deed for people. We have created a torpedo that accounts for almost half of the fleet's ammunition load. No, I don't know your secret ammunition loads. I know the serial numbers of the torpedoes being manufactured and I don’t remember any other type being produced in such quantities. I remind you about the State Prize. Don't we deserve it?

- They deserve it, they deserve it. It seems a bit late. Or maybe the other way around is better? - Grant thought about it, - we tried to formalize it. Do you remember? What did the Military-Industrial Commission tell us? The speed is slow, the range is short.

- But there is no thermal torpedo cheaper, simpler and more reliable than ours. So you leave, and no one will deal with this issue. For your leader on thermal torpedoes, Alexander Sergeevich Spekhov, it is already a thing of the past, and he will not deal with this issue.

- Well, why are you doing this? My new deputy just recently worked with a commission to save your torpedo from another run-up. Do you remember the emergency in Kamchatka?

- Still would. Last October we met with him in Kamchatka. Then a fire occurred while pumping oxygen into the torpedo. Oxygen is a delicate matter. Doesn't tolerate dirt. Proving where the fire started when half the torpedo burned out is not easy. And we succeeded in finding the parts that fell out of the torpedo and were not burned. We didn't have time to hide them. The torpedo, Grant, has more friends than those who, during every emergency, first of all climb into the structure to blame the plant. But still, what about the bonus?

- No way, Danya. The torpedo has many friends, but no fewer enemies. Not everything is going well with the practical torpedo right now. Start sinking torpedoes at the end of the range..

- If I were you, I would classify such shots as positive. The torpedo completed its main task. The rescue system failed. There are no such systems in combat torpedoes.

- You would, you would. Give the go-ahead not to count these losses, so tomorrow all practical torpedoes will have all failures at the end of the range. Well, no, no special instructions are required on how to rub in glasses.

- Maybe you’re right... Then I’ll tell you for your information. At one meeting on the improvement of Almaty, our director Vadim Shnurnikov reported to Dinmukhamed Akhmedovich Kunaev on the oxygen torpedo. They say, we’ve been doing this for more than ten years, there are thousands of torpedoes in the fleet, but the team can’t get enough incentives. Kunaev considered this an infringement of national interests and ordered the preparation of materials for the State Prize. He said that he would report to Brezhnev himself. From the military we will include Petrov. He worked hard to improve the reliability of the torpedo. I already told him. He is modest. But you can report to Butov or not. Your business.

Grant thought about it. The instinct of the old bureaucrat told Grant that he needed to go to Butov immediately: “No matter what happens! And in fact they will sign with Brezhnev. What then? Why didn’t he know, didn’t take action, didn’t report?”

- Wait for me, I’ll be there soon. He returned about thirty minutes later.

- That's it, Danya. Apply for the State Award as required, through the State Committee. And instead of Petrov, include Butov.

“But he didn’t take any part.”

- How did you not accept this? He's the boss. He signed all the papers. In short, act as I said.

- What about Petrov? We already told him.

- Hurry up. Nothing. Let's say that the Commander-in-Chief... In short, it's too early for him. Will have time to get it. Butov has long wanted to be a laureate. The rocket men turned it on for “Waterfall”, but it went wrong there. All the bosses around are, if not candidates, then laureates... And he is the only one without a title.

- But Grant, I will definitely include you in the torpedo development team. Without you, this torpedo would not exist.

“If it weren’t for this torpedo, I wouldn’t be here,” Akopov joked gloomily, “these State Awards would be nothing but trouble.” I already have one. For 65–76. Without me it wouldn't exist either. When there is no State Prize, you want it, and when there is one, you think about who to give it to.

Grant looked at his watch.

- It's time for me to go to the Central Committee. They call to the curator. Looks like some kind of anonymous person. Maybe even on your torpedo. People "write".

Grant opened the safe, took out his party card and two badges: State Prize Laureate and Honored Inventor. I put on my jacket and attached my signs.

- Well, Danya, the issue has been resolved. The fleets will give positive reviews. Stay calm. Now go to Butov. He will remember how he held meetings to improve the reliability of your torpedo. Or he will suggest introducing some kind of valve. For complicity. As a contribution. I swear on bread!

The 53–65K torpedo, a child of the S. M. Kirov Machine-Building Plant, has been in combat service for torpedo weapons in the fleet for more than thirty years. The torpedo, of course, contains “pieces” from the Central Research Institute “Gidropribor”, but this does not detract from, but increases the merits of the plant. After all, scientists would most likely still be arguing about what to take as a basis and “how to build a bridge.” The creation of the 53–65K torpedo is a rare example of both close cooperation and irreconcilable competition of monopolists on the one hand and young enthusiasm on the other: the Central Research Institute "Gidropribor" with the Mine Torpedo Institute on the one hand and the plant's Design Bureau on the other... At the same time, cooperation and competition took place through the soul of one person - Grant Migranovich Akopov...

It seems that even now Daniil Samuilovich, on the instructions of plant director Gali Tuleuevich Basenov, is developing a new torpedo for export. It's a pity that the plant is now abroad.

Russian maybe

At the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy V. Chirkov, an expert council of the Navy was held under the chairmanship of the head of the Naval Academy Nikolai Maksimov. The purpose of the expert council was declared as follows: to develop proposals to solve the problem of providing the Navy with torpedo weapons. As a result, the council recommended that the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy accept and go to sea with expired torpedoes, “minimalist” repaired Navy arsenals according to the “Temporary Instructions” (355 torpedoes in total).

“The actual service life of a product is not limited by the service life provided, but is determined by its technical condition.” This is what is written in the council's decision. At this point I really want to spit over my shoulder three times. Because in fact, the Navy expert council officially proposed replacing Russian GOST standards with Russian ones. However, the expert council nevertheless played it safe and recommended that before loading expired torpedoes onto Russian ships and boats, “inspect the repaired 3-5 products by a special commission of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation... If the repaired torpedoes do not meet the technical conditions, make a separate decision...”

Six months have passed. The Ministry of Defense commission has not yet been created. No test firing is planned. As I understand it, if there had been confidence in the quality of the repairs, the shooting would have taken place long ago?

Developed by Mashzavod im. Kirov" a comprehensive program for the proper repair of 53-65K was transferred to the Ministry of Defense back in February (available from Novaya Gazeta). They didn’t want to approve it. According to our sources, it was decided to extend the “Temporary Instructions” for the recertification of the oxygen torpedo. 335, it is not clear how the repaired torpedoes will be put into operation without test firing, with the motivation: to meet the needs of the fleet in 2013-2014. In the future, the oxygen torpedo will be repaired using rubber products.

The chances of a repetition of the Kursk tragedy are higher than ever.

*JSC Machine-Building Plant named after S.M. Kirov" was built in 1942 on the basis of plant No. 182, evacuated from Makhachkala, which shortly before merged with the Tokmak plant named after. Kirov. In Soviet times, it was one of the leading diesel and torpedo manufacturing plants in the USSR. Currently part of the national one, created in 2003. It is the only manufacturer of torpedoes with thermal propulsion systems in the CIS. **The concern was created in 2004 on the basis of the Central Research Institute Gidropribor. 100% of shares belong to the state. It is a monopolist in the production of naval underwater weapons. ***Quote from an interview with the First Deputy General Director of the plant, Sergei Nedosekin, to Forbes of Kazakhstan dated 02/07/2013.

Soviet thermonuclear torpedo T-15

The T-15 torpedo has remained a legend in the history of the Russian Navy. She disappeared before she could appear, but formed the appearance of our first nuclear submarines. At the height of the Cold War, on August 12, 1953, successful tests were carried out on a new Soviet weapon of monstrous destructive power - the thermonuclear bomb. One of the creators of this bomb, recently elected a full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 32-year-old Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov, proposed using the developed Project 627 nuclear submarines as a “delivery vehicle”, equipping each of them with a giant torpedo for a thermonuclear 100-megaton charge (approximately 6000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima). According to the young academician’s plan, these torpedoes exploded off the ocean coast of the United States were supposed to cause a tsunami of unprecedented power, 300 meters high, which would simply wash away American cities, causing irreparable damage to the United States.

However, speaking about the tactics of using a super torpedo, the academician was lying. According to his version, the submarine was supposed to approach 40 km to the enemy naval base and fire a torpedo at it, which was supposed to enter the inner bay of the base and explode. But, after talking with the admirals, the project leaders realized that with such tactics, the submarine would most likely have been destroyed on the approach to the American base. The US Navy's anti-submarine defenses of the mid-to-late 1950s were unlikely to allow an enemy submarine into the 50-kilometer zone around its base. In addition, the entrances to most American naval bases were hidden many kilometers away by the winding shores of bays, islands, and shoals. Even in peacetime, the entrance to the base is covered by booms. So, even without the enemy’s anti-aircraft defense system, the torpedo had no chance of hitting the pier. In fact, the tactics for using a super torpedo should have been completely different. The submarine had to secretly fire a torpedo at a distance from the coast much greater than 40 km. And not at the entrance to the base, but preferably away from it. The super torpedo had to use up all the energy from the batteries and lie on the ground. In wartime, the time fuse was then switched on, firing only when the boat could be guaranteed to move to a safe distance. And in the pre-war period, the torpedo fuse could be in the waiting mode for a long time (days, weeks) for a radio signal and hydroacoustic signal, according to which the charge was detonated.

Thus, the super torpedo, having reached a predetermined point, became a bottom mine. Thanks to this system, several Project 627 nuclear submarines could, in the pre-war period, secretly place thermonuclear charges in neutral waters near the enemy’s most important targets.

For reasons of secrecy, the development of the T-15 torpedo was started without the involvement of the Navy. The 6th Department of the Navy learned about this torpedo only through the project of the first nuclear submarine - “Project 627” - the chief designer of which was V.N. Peregudov. The supposed armament of the nuclear boat became known to the fleet only in December 1953, after the approval of the tactical and technical characteristics of preliminary design 627. The sailors were greatly surprised by it. The first compartment of the submarine housed one huge torpedo tube, which almost completely replaced traditional torpedo weapons. The length of the torpedo tube was 23.5 meters (22 percent of the total length of the submarine). On the submarine, in addition to a one and a half meter torpedo, it was planned to install two bow 533-mm torpedo tubes with torpedoes for self-defense. No spare torpedoes were provided. This unusual layout of the submarine is explained by the dimensions of the T-15 torpedo developed at NII-400 under the leadership of chief designer Shamarin N.N. The length of the torpedo was about 23 meters, the mass of the torpedo was 40 tons, the mass of the warhead was 3.5-4 thousand kg. The main weight load fell on the battery, which provided the torpedo with a speed of 29 knots, while the cruising range was 30 kilometers. It was proposed to use a thermonuclear charge in the T-15 torpedo. The warhead of the torpedo was developed at KB-11 of the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building, under the leadership of chief designer Yu. B. Khariton. The thermonuclear charge was to be detonated by an impact or remote (time) fuse. The firing control of the T-15 torpedo was provided by the Tantalum torpedo firing control station.

The tactical and technical elements of the submarine were approved on December 21, 1953. In July of the following year, SKB-143 completed the technical design of the nuclear submarine. On October 18, 1954, the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry and the Ministry of Medium Machine Building submitted a technical project to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. After this, the Ministry of Defense was asked to review the project and send its conclusion to the Council of Ministers. The head of the Ministry of Defense N.A. Bulganin instructed Admiral P.G. Kotov, Assistant Minister for Naval Affairs, to deal with this issue. At the same time, the issue of admitting specialists and naval leaders to the project was decided.

In 1954, an expert commission was formed headed by Vice Admiral A.E. Orel, head of the Directorate of the General Staff of the Navy. The Navy mainly objected to the composition of the nuclear submarine's armament. According to naval experts, the fleet does not need a submarine with such weapons. In addition, serious doubts arose that the submarine would be able to come within the launch range of the T-15 torpedo (40 kilometers), and that the torpedo itself would work as expected. Against this background, based on the results of the Navy’s examination, it was decided to adjust the technical design of the 627 nuclear submarine. By Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 588-364 of March 26, 1955, the technical design of the submarine was approved only with 533-mm torpedo tubes, and work on the T-15 was stopped.

Main characteristics of the T-15 torpedo: Caliber, mm: 1550; Torpedo mass, kg: 40000; Torpedo length, cm: 2355; Energy type: electric; Nuclear charge: thermonuclear ~100 megatons; Torpedo carrier: Project 627 nuclear submarine

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The case of Vladimir Fitzner

“You stood in my way on the fourth of January,” said Professor Moriarty. “On the twenty-third you troubled me again.” In mid-February you already seriously disturbed me. At the end of March you completely upset my plans, and now I find myself in a position where I face a real danger of losing my freedom. This can't go on! Conan Doyle

Five years ago, former submariner Vladimir Fitzner had an idea: how to bring the Mashzavod im. CM. Kirov”, if Magomed does not go to the mountain.

“None of the representatives of the fleet or enterprises carrying out work in the interests of the Russian Navy officially contacted the plant. And only in 2009, the general director of NPO Bars CJSC Vladimir Fitzner visited the enterprise on an official visit on the issue of providing the Russian fleet with torpedo weapons and spare parts for them” - so, a little pretentiously, the first deputy general director of Mashzavod im. Kirov" Sergei Nedosekin.

But it really was a turning point in torpedo history. The energetic Fitzner proposed the idea of ​​a joint venture - JV Arsenal-Mashzavod LLC and became the official representative of the Kazakh plant in Russia.

In 2010, Fitzner took a delegation of the Russian Navy to Alma-Ata to personally see that the plant was alive. The Directorate of Underwater Weapons of the Russian Navy gave permission to the 18th Arsenal of the Navy to purchase a trial batch of 30 new sets of spare parts from Mashzavod named after. Kirov" for the repair of an oxygen torpedo. At the end of 2010, the 18th Arsenal of the Navy was the only one that fulfilled the state defense order for the recertification of 56-63K. The repaired products passed the incoming inspection without a single comment or complaint. An important fact: the original spare parts kit turned out to be cheaper and cost 338 thousand rubles, including delivery from Kazakhstan. In the same 2010, a set of spare parts cost the Russian budget 370 thousand rubles.

...On June 22, 2011, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov signed order No. 989 “On the creation of a working group to develop solutions to provide Navy ships with anti-ship torpedoes.” Over the course of two years, the working group (including Vladimir Fitzner as a representative of the Kirov Machine Plant) conducted a large-scale inventory of the problem. To quote Moriarty, many officials faced a real danger of losing their freedom.

As experts, representatives of the Mashzavod named after. Kirov" gave their opinion on the "Kan case" against the "10th Arsenal of the Navy" and the "15th Arsenal of the Navy". Questions also arose for the MPO-Gidropribor concern, in particular, for its spare parts and accessories, which exist on paper, but were not delivered to the arsenals in the required quantities either in 2011 or 2012.

On December 6, 2012, the working group on torpedo weapons is preparing recommendations for the new Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu: “Refurbishment of products 243 with the assignment of a new service life is recommended to be carried out by JV Arsenal-Mashzavod LLC in cooperation with the developer company Mashinostroitelny Zavod im. . CM. Kirov", as well as with TNK Dastan and NPO Kiev Automation Plant named after. G.I. Petrovsky" at the enterprises of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation."

...And on December 18, 2012, Professor Moriarty made a response move.

Application

Il-4 T with torpedo 45-36 AN

The 45-36 AN torpedo was precisely dropped from a height of 30 m at a speed of approximately 300 km/h. It was impossible to drop this torpedo below or above this height, since in this case it could either be destroyed by hitting the water or go deeper. Low-altitude torpedo throwing provided the highest probability of hitting a sea surface target, but required a fairly high level of crew training and the aircraft having excellent aerobatic and maneuvering characteristics.

Processing the results obtained made it possible to establish that during a single torpedo launch from Il-4 aircraft, up to 8% of torpedoes are lost, from Tu-2 aircraft - 15%, and during group torpedo throwing (when torpedoes are dropped at the command of the leader), the losses are 12 and 20%, respectively. More than half of the sinking of all torpedoes occurred due to the pilot’s failure to maintain flight conditions, and up to 71% - due to failure to comply with the specified flight altitude at the time of separation of the torpedo, which, in turn, depended on the aircraft’s flight speed. Calculations have shown that with an increase in speed by 100 km/h, the height increases to 56 m. The angles of entry of the torpedo into the water should be within the range of 13° - 18°.

In the spring of 1944, a new method of torpedo launching was born - a joint attack by a torpedo bomber with a topmast bomber. The top-mast was the first to attack at maximum speed. Bombs were dropped at low altitude 200-300 m from the target. Not having time to reach a vertical position, they ricocheted, hitting the target ship on the side. At the same time, the torpedo bomber dropped a torpedo 600-700 m from the target. Its hit completed the defeat of the target.

The 45-36 AN torpedo became the main model of torpedo weapons used by Soviet aviation throughout the war. High-altitude torpedo throwing turned out to be ineffective and was practically not used during the war.

In total, 1,294 torpedoes were used by aviation during the war, and 399 enemy ships and transports were sunk.

Aviation anti-submarine torpedo AT-1.

Aviation anti-submarine torpedo AT-1 (PLAT-1).

Developer: NII-400 (Central Research Institute "Gidropribor") Country: USSR Start of development: 1959 Tests: 1961-1962 Adopted into service: 1962

In the USSR, the development of aircraft anti-submarine torpedoes began in the late 50s under the code PLAT-1. The development of the torpedo was carried out at NII-400 (Central Research Institute "Gidropribor") according to Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N 111-463 "On the creation of new types of anti-submarine weapons" dated October 13, 1960. Chief designer - P.V. Matveev (source - R. Gusev), according to other data - A.G. Belyakov.

AT-1 torpedo.

The preliminary design of individual components of the traffic control system began in 1959. Two versions of the torpedo were developed - aircraft and helicopter. The differences in the parachute braking system are the helicopter version - 2 x 2.5 sq.m parachute, the airplane version - a stabilizing parachute 0.6 sq.m and a braking parachute 5.4 sq.m.

The torpedo is equipped with an inertial control system with an active-passive acoustic homing system (SHS), operating in two planes. Fuses - contact and non-contact. The chief designer of the SSN is V.I. Kolesnikov, the proximity fuse is A.N. Shashikhin, and the control devices are V.F. Nekrasov. The rotation speed of the gyroscopes is 1400 rpm.

Suspension of the AT-1 anti-submarine torpedo on the Ka-25PL.

The launch of the torpedo to a given initial search depth, which the crew sets before dropping, is ensured by a splashdown system consisting of a split ring with two wings attached to it with a constant installation angle of 30°. The wings open simultaneously with the braking parachute.

The torpedo's power plant includes a DP-11M birotative DC electric motor and a TS-4 silver-zinc battery (silver content about 8 kg). The main consumers receive power from the battery: homing equipment, control equipment, and proximity fuse. An air cylinder with a capacity of up to 0.7 liters and a pressure of 200 kg/cm2 controls the electric starting equipment of the torpedo and maintains constant pressure in the hydraulic system when the steering gears are operating.

Layout diagram of the AT-1 torpedo.

Simultaneously with setting the initial search depth, power is connected from the aircraft's on-board network to the control devices and homing equipment, the gyroscopes first reach 1400 rpm, the homing equipment and the proximity fuse are heated. After separation from the aircraft, the torpedo switches to autonomous power supply, the pilot chute activates the stabilizing dome, which ensures a descent speed of 100-120 m/s. At an altitude of 500 m, the stabilizing parachute separates, the main parachute opens, and the descent speed decreases to 45-55 m/s.

When a torpedo dives, its parachute system is separated, with the help of the wings it is removed from the “bag”, after which the latter are fired back. Control devices bring the torpedo to a given initial search depth. At a depth of 20 m, the hydrostatic mechanisms of the contact fuse are triggered and 25 seconds from the moment the torpedo’s electrical circuit is turned on, the remote fuse of the homing equipment is triggered, and it comes into firing position. Having reached a given depth, the torpedo begins to perform a left search circulation with a radius of 60-70 m with an angular velocity of 12° per second.

The pulse generator of the homing equipment, switched on when its remote fuse is triggered, alternately delivers after 0.85 seconds. electrical impulses to the upper and lower hydrophones of the receiving-emitting device. Electrical impulses are converted into ultrasonic ones and the torpedo, circulating at a given depth, “scans” the aquatic environment. At the same time, an autonomous passive channel listens to target noise. When a signal reflected from the target is received via the active channel or target noise is detected by the passive channel, control of the torpedo in the vertical plane is transferred to the vertical maneuvering unit, and in the horizontal plane, control continues with the heading automatic, but maneuvering according to commands from the homing equipment is carried out at lower angular velocities (9° per second ).

When a torpedo passes at a distance of 5-6 m from the target, ultrasonic pulses emitted by the non-contact fuse and reflected from the target cause the actuating part of the non-contact fuse to be triggered, the circuit is closed to the ignition devices of the contact fuses, and the torpedo charge is detonated. When a target is directly hit, the fuses are triggered by inertial forces.

If the accuracy of aiming at the target turns out to be insufficient and acoustic contact with it is lost, the torpedo begins a secondary search, circulating in the place where the target was lost until it is detected again. In case of non-targeting after 9 minutes. The contact fuses of the torpedo are triggered by the action of the self-destructor and it is undermined.

During a practical drop, after the torpedo has passed a given distance or has deepened it, the hydrostatic stop mechanism breaks the power supply circuit of the instruments, equipment and contactor windings. The latter opens the power circuit of the power motor. It stops, and the torpedo, having positive buoyancy, floats up. When the power from the instruments and equipment of the torpedo is turned off, the noise emitters are turned on, and when the torpedo surfaces to a depth of 7.5 m, a hydraulic switch and a smoke detector are activated, making it easier to detect.

Tests of the torpedo were first carried out on Lake Ladoga in 1961 and continued on the Black Sea. During tests on the Black Sea, a specially converted Project 613 target submarine was used - the submarine's propellers were covered with a casing, and the hull was covered with a protective wooden coating.

According to all the stated data, the AT-1 torpedo was intended to destroy submarines whose speed does not exceed 25 knots and whose depth is up to 200 m. But as calculations showed, the probability of hitting submarines with a speed of about 10 knots (18.5 km/h) , did not exceed 10-15% (Be-12 aircraft). Subsequently, recommendations were developed for the use of two torpedoes in a series, and to test the theoretical principles in 1969, special research flights were carried out with torpedoes being dropped at the Chauda test site (Black Sea) from a Be-12 aircraft.

Helicopter search and targeting systems, which include hydroacoustic stations, make it possible to obtain more complete information about the underwater situation in the form of bearing and range of the target and elements of its movement. In this regard, the idea arose to develop remote-controlled anti-submarine torpedoes for helicopters, bearing in mind the possibility of their use from hovering mode.

The torpedo was put into service in 1962 (according to other sources in 1963) under the name AT-1. The production of torpedoes was carried out (Kaspiysk). Serial production of torpedoes ceased in 1970; a total of 925 torpedoes were produced. Based on the AT-1M torpedo, a helicopter torpedo with remote control from the hovering mode of the T-67 “Strizh” (VVT-1) was developed.

Modifications: - AT-1 (PLAT-1, product 242) - a basic version of an aircraft torpedo for use from altitudes from 20 to 2000 m. - AT-1M - modernization of the Design Bureau (Kaspiysk, Dagestan). The pneumatic contactor has been replaced with an electromagnetic one. - AT-1MV - a modernized helicopter version. — AT-1E — export version.

Performance characteristics of the torpedo: Caliber, mm: 450 Length, mm: - 4030 (aircraft version) - 4000 (helicopter version) Weight, kg: - 580 (airplane version) - 560 (helicopter version) Explosive weight, kg: 70 Application altitude, m : - 400-2000 (airplane version) - 20-500 (helicopter version) Carrier speed during use, km/h: up to 600 Travel range, m: 5000 Travel depth, m: 20-200 Carriers: - Mi-4T helicopters, Mi-14PL, Ka-25PL, Ka-27PL; — Be-12, Il-38, Tu-142 aircraft.

Layout of the AT-1M torpedo.

AT-1 torpedo.

AT-1 torpedo.

AT-1 torpedo.

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List of sources: Equipment and Armament. A. Artemyev. Aviation torpedoes. R. Gusev. Such is the life of a torpedo. S. Proshkin, V. Marinin, Russian torpedo weapons. Aviation and Time. V.D.Roman. Ka-25 is the “long arm” of Admiral Gorshkov. Anatoly Artemyev. Be-12: a plane of three elements.

Torpedoes of the Russian Navy of the 19th century

Alexandrovsky torpedo

In 1862, Russian inventor Ivan Fedorovich Aleksandrovsky designed the first Russian submarine powered by a pneumatic engine. Initially, the boat was supposed to be armed with two linked mines, which were supposed to be released when the boat sailed under an enemy ship and, emerging, covered its hull. It was planned to detonate the mines using an electric remote fuse. The significant complexity and danger of such an attack forced Aleksandrovsky to develop a different type of weapon. For this purpose, he is designing an underwater self-propelled projectile, similar in design to a submarine, but smaller in size and with an automatic control mechanism. Aleksandrovsky calls his projectile a “self-propelled torpedo,” although later in the Russian Navy the generally accepted expression became “self-propelled mine.”

Alexandrovsky torpedo 1875

Eastern Kronstadt raid with propeller ballasts

In tests under partial pressure in three launches, the 24-inch version covered a distance of 760 m, maintaining a depth of about 1.8 m. The speed in the first three hundred meters was 8 knots, in the final - 5 knots. Further tests showed that with high accuracy, maintaining the depth and direction of travel. The torpedo was too slow and could not reach a speed of more than 8 knots even in the 22-inch version. The second model of the Aleksandrovsky torpedo was built in 1876 and had a more advanced two-cylinder engine, and instead of a ballast system for maintaining depth, a gyrostat was used to control the tail horizontal rudders. But when the torpedo was ready for testing, the Naval Ministry sent Aleksandrovsky to the Whitehead plant. Having familiarized himself with the characteristics of the torpedoes from Fiume, Aleksandrovsky admitted that his torpedoes were significantly inferior to the Austrian ones and recommended that the fleet purchase torpedoes from competitors. In 1878, Whitehead and Aleksandrovsky torpedoes were subjected to comparative tests. The Russian torpedo showed a speed of 18 knots, losing only 2 knots to Whitehead's torpedo. In the conclusion of the testing commission, it was concluded that both torpedoes have a similar principle and combat qualities, but by that time the license for the production of torpedoes had already been acquired and the production of Aleksandrovsky torpedoes was considered inappropriate.

Main performance characteristics

Characteristics and modifications

53-38U

One of the constant concerns of TsKB-39 specialists was the increase in the weight of explosives in torpedoes. In 1939, a group of designers under the leadership of A.P. Belyakov increased the weight of explosives in torpedoes by 80-100 kg by lengthening the combat charging compartments (BZO). Experimental testing has shown that torpedoes 45-36N and 53-38 with extended BZO practically do not lose their performance. At the end of 1939, the modernized models were put into service. They became known as 45-36NU and 53-38U. One of the significant features of the 53-38U torpedo was that it was subsequently equipped with a proximity fuse.

What did a proximity fuse give to a torpedo? Firstly, it ensured the explosion of an explosive charge under the bottom of the target ship, that is, in its least protected part, and secondly, it made it possible to less accurately determine the draft of the target ship before firing. The first domestic non-contact fuse (NVO) began to be developed in 1927 at the Ostekhbyuro. He reacted to the ship's distortion of the vertical component of the Earth's magnetic field. The fuse was intended for 45-12 torpedoes. The NVO was adopted into service in 1932. Alas, the first pancake turned out to be lumpy. The fuse had two fundamental disadvantages: dependence on the latitude of the place, which required constant adjustment of the fuse, and its excessive sensitivity to the roll and trim of the torpedo. As a result, frequent operations forced the production of the fuse to soon cease. Fundamental science was also involved in the work - Leningrad University, the Institute of Terrestrial Magnetism of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The work was headed by NIMTI employee A.K. Vereshchagin. Tests of the new fuse were carried out in the Baltic in 1941: “when firing at the Tosno ship with a displacement of 2500 tons, the fuse reliably went off under the keel at a distance of 2.5 m. There were no spontaneous activations.” And yet they decided to test the fuse in other geographical conditions. The tests were planned to be carried out in the Northern, Pacific and Black Sea fleets. However, the war began, we had to limit ourselves to the Northern Fleet. The firing at the destroyer and transport carried out here yielded positive results. In 1941, the NBC (stabilized non-contact fuse) was put into service. It entered service with the active fleets in 1942. 243 torpedoes were fired when equipped with the NAF. There were no failures in the operation of the fuse.

53-39

Based on open press data, the USSR called the 53-39 torpedo the most reliable and fastest torpedo in the world. In 1941, during state tests, it was possible to achieve a speed of 51 knots. The best publicly demonstrated (Type 93 does not count) foreign torpedoes (Italian - probably Silure Tipo W. 270/533.4 × 7.20 Veloce from the same Fiume Whitehead plant) at that time gave a speed per knot less. The development of a high-speed torpedo based on the Model 53-38 torpedo began in 1939. As a result of a number of technical improvements and intensive long-term tests, this torpedo was put into service in July 1941 and was mastered by the fleet during the war. The torpedo was 3-mode (later - 2-mode), universal, intended for use from all classes of surface ships and submarines. Increasing the speed of this torpedo while maintaining its range was achieved by increasing energy resources: air, water and kerosene, as well as modernizing the engine. For the creation of torpedo 53-39, the team of authors - engineers D. A. Kokryakov, V. L. Orlov, D. N. Ostrovsky and others - was awarded the Stalin Prize. The disadvantage of the torpedo was the easily detectable trail that remains after combustion gases that do not dissolve in water.

Torpedo 53-61

The first domestic homing torpedo, put into service in 1950, having a speed of 28 knots and a range of 6000 m, did not provide effective use against high-speed ships. It was an electric torpedo SAET-50 with an acoustic passive guidance system. It was necessary to transfer the SSN to high-speed homing torpedoes.

This problem was solved at the Lomonosov branch of NII-400 Morteplotekhnika by a group of designers led by V.S. Osipov. the adoption of the 53-61 anti-ship homing torpedo into service in 1961.

Torpedo 53-61 with the Andromeda special launch vehicle. Submarine Museum U-434, Hamburg, Germany, 02/23/2010 (photo - Alexander Konovalov, https://forums.airbase.ru).

Main parts of the torpedo: I – charging compartment; II – air tank with kerosene compartment; III – oxidizer reservoir; IV – turbine compartment; V – aft compartment; VI – tail section.

General design of torpedo 53-61 (clicking opens a drawing of 7000x1200 characters in 1.6 MB)

The PZO included a water (in winter, ethyl alcohol solution) solution as ballast and a system for its displacement. It also housed recording equipment (depth and roll autograph and oscilloscopes), tracking devices (fatty or missile) and torpedo location markings (light and acoustic).

The development of the torpedo was carried out at the Lomonosov branch of NII-400 (branch of the Central Research Institute "Gidropribor") "Morteplotekhnika". The designers continued to develop torpedoes with engines powered by low-water hydrogen peroxide. In parallel with the work on the delivery of the 53-57 (DBT) torpedo, using the material remaining from their experimental batch, we conducted a study on the possibility of its modernization at stands and sea testing grounds. The efficiency of the 2T torpedo engine 53-57 due to the low temperature of the steam gas in the combustion chamber did not meet future requirements. It was necessary to develop turbine engines with significantly higher power. The 53-61 torpedo (DBST - long-range, traceless, dual-mode homing torpedo) required a 735 hp engine. With. in mode I and a power of 185 hp. With. on mode II. The circuit diagram of the new engine was kept the same as that of the 2T engine. The combustion chamber, nozzle apparatus, speed reducer were thoroughly redesigned, and the turbine rotor was slightly redesigned. The engine was given the code 2TF (boosted).

Energy components: - Low-water hydrogen peroxide (HPV) 82-85% - T-1 kerosene - Sea and fresh water - K-83s catalyst for the decomposition of HPV (a mixture of irregularly shaped grains containing copper oxide, manganese dioxide, alkali metal carbonates - Air

In the Morteplotechnics department, headed by A.P. Varyukhov, a group of specialists was formed headed by A.A. Kostrov and Yu.R. Akhimov, who were supposed to create SSN equipment capable of detecting a target by the acoustic field reflected from it or its wake and provide subsequent control of the movement of the torpedo towards it in the horizontal plane. The principle of operation of the SSN, which received the Andromeda code, was as follows:

Approach to the target was carried out at high speed until the distance set before the shot was passed. Then the torpedo switched to low-speed mode, and the SSN equipment began working 20 s after switching, during which the speed, depth and roll stabilized. During the search, two vibrators connected to a pulse generator worked alternately. After approaching the target or its wake to the echo-direction-finding distance and upon receiving reflected signals in two successive cycles, maneuvering took place and entered a parallel pursuit course. In this case, the torpedo circulated with a “small” radius with the vertical rudders completely repositioned, and with the start of parallel pursuit - along a snake with a “large” radius. At this stage, the outermost on-board vibrator was working. After overtaking the target, when the reflected signals ceased to arrive, the torpedo turned towards it, and the proximity fuse equipment was brought into combat mode. If the fuse did not go off, the attack was repeated in a similar way from the other side.

In 1955 - 1956 conducted a series of sea tests, during which the possibility of controlling an “overweighted” torpedo was determined (the DBT was 500 kg heavier than electric and 250 kg heavier than serial gas-steam torpedoes of similar dimensions) at reduced speeds. The result was the adoption of the Navy's decision to create a dual-mode hydrogen peroxide torpedo with an active acoustic booster and a proximity fuse. V.S. was appointed its chief designer. Osipov, deputy for energy and power department - A.A. Panova, according to SSN – A.A. Kostrova.

In 1957-1958, a series of naval tests were carried out at sea: the torpedo's progress in modes I and II and their switching, as well as the operation of the SSN, were tested. Work at sea had to be stopped: the torpedoes went “deaf” or left the guidance trajectory, and we had to return to circuit and bench tests of the SSN blocks. At the same time, the task was set to produce new guidance equipment in the shortest possible time.

N.F. was appointed head of the development of new equipment and deputy chief designer. Yevtushenko. His group quickly produced technical documentation, and within three months the equipment was called “Jeyran”. Sea trials of the new SSN were carried out in November-December 1958. Of the 16 shots, 11 were passed in all respects. The management recognized the Jeyran equipment as quite competitive with the previous Andromeda guidance system.

Comparative tests of torpedoes with modified Andromeda and Jeyran equipment were carried out. EM pr. 30-bis and SKR pr. 50 were used as target ships at speeds up to 18 knots. We fired 27 torpedo shots from the first SSN and 30 from the second. Both equipment worked reliably during testing, but preference was still given to Andromeda.

Sea proving grounds tests took place in 1959 with submarines and NK. The test results of torpedoes with TKA Project 183 turned out to be unsatisfactory and it was decided to present the DBST torpedo with Andromeda homing equipment for state testing as intended for use with submarines.

In September 1960, 11 torpedoes were transferred for state tests. In their course, 45 shooting sessions were carried out, of which 20 were taken into account. Moreover, almost all failures occurred as a result of errors in the preparation of the material and the organization of firing. By firing from the Project 613 submarine, they tested the homing of a torpedo at a forward-moving and maneuvering ship, at a high-speed target, at a ship in conditions of single explosions of depth charges. Salvo firing was carried out, the exit of torpedoes from the maximum depth of their use and the functionality of the proximity fuse together with a unified ignition device were checked.

The positive results of state tests were followed by a decision by the USSR Council of Ministers to accept the DBST torpedo into service with Navy submarines and assign it the code 53-61. Soon the director of the enterprise M.P. Maksimov, chief designer V.S. Osipov and his deputies were awarded the State Prize for the work done, and many participants in the development were awarded orders and medals.

In the first years of operation in the fleets of torpedoes 53-61 there were no comments on the rotors, but starting in 1965, information began to arrive from the arsenals of the fleets, which was assessed as extraordinary by all authorities: rotors that passed all checks before being accepted into the arsenal, after storage in torpedoes in containers filled with nitrogen develop deep cracks within 3-5 years, precluding their use. This practically meant that the fleet lost its ammunition for the newest torpedo. And since 1962, torpedoes 53-61 were also used as carriers of special weapons. BZO with a nuclear charge. The departments of the Navy and SMEs ordered the designer and manufacturer of the torpedo to urgently begin research into the reasons for the destruction of the rotors and the search for new materials with the involvement of scientific organizations of other ministries.

In 1968, after analyzing defective disks, the Central Research Institute of Mechanical Engineering of the USSR Academy of Sciences concluded: the destruction of the rotors occurs due to the delayed effect of residual stresses; The main reason for high voltages in the rotor and their residual values ​​should be considered to be the low quality of machining of the impellers. On the recommendation of VIAM, by decision of the SME management, the engine rotor material (EI-481 steel) of 53-61 torpedoes was replaced in 1968 with chromium-nickel-titanium steel EI-696M, and in 1970 with improved steel EI-696MVD. Replacing the material and taking other measures eliminated the destruction of the rotors during storage of torpedoes.

In 1969, an SSN with vertical echolocation of the wake, designed by E.B. Parfenov, was installed in the torpedo. The modernized torpedo was adopted under the code 53-61MA.

Literature and sources: 1. Description of the torpedo 53-61, part 1, part 3, album of drawings for the description. M.: Voenizdat, 1965. UNCLASSIFIED 2. Chechot O. The first domestic homing steam-gas torpedo. Article. Marine collection No. 1-1997, pp. 68-71 3. Research Institute of Marine Thermal Engineering. Pages of history. Edited by Yu.S. Dovzhenko. St. Petersburg, 2009. 4. Zhukov L.M. About what has been accomplished, done, seen (from the history of the development of torpedoes with thermal energy). Research Institute of Marine Thermal Engineering. St. Petersburg, 2014

The author collects biographical material about the designers of naval underwater weapons and asks everyone who has biographical materials on the designers mentioned on this page to respond!

Notes

1. According to the spelling rules of that time - “Chesma”
2. On May 29, 1877, during the Battle of Pacocha Bay, the English frigate Shah attacked the Peruvian monitor Huascar with a torpedo, but missed the target.
3. later - St. Petersburg.
4. In a birotative motor, the rotor and stator have opposite directions of rotation, which makes it possible to connect propellers with multidirectional rotation to it without the use of a gearbox.
5. A circulating torpedo differs from a conventional torpedo in its ability to move along a predetermined complex trajectory, in the simplest case - in a circle or spiral at low speed.
6. Liquid-jet engine.

Story

Robert Whitehead and his torpedo

Dropping a torpedo from a British aircraft (circa 1918)

Mine (torpedo) compartment of a submarine from the First World War. 1916

Mk.46 torpedoes on the suspensions of the Lynx anti-submarine helicopter
The first idea of ​​a self-propelled naval projectile was expressed by the Italian engineer Giovanni da Fontana at the beginning of the 15th century[9]. The term “torpedo” was first used to refer to naval ammunition by Robert Fulton at the beginning of the 19th century. Throughout the 19th century, various engineers developed projects for underwater self-propelled projectiles, but with rocket propulsion.

The first self-propelled mine (“self-propelled torpedo”) was created in 1865 by the Russian inventor I. F. Aleksandrovsky[2][10].

“In 1865,” writes Aleksandrovsky, “I presented... to Admiral N.K. Krabbe (manager of the Naval Ministry of Autonomous Republic) a project for a self-propelled torpedo that I had invented. The essence... the torpedo is nothing more than a miniature copy of the submarine I invented. As in my submarine, so in my torpedo, the main engine is compressed air, the same horizontal rudders for direction at the desired depth... with the only difference that the submarine is controlled by people, and the self-propelled torpedo... by an automatic mechanism. Upon presentation of my project for a self-propelled torpedo, N. K. Krabbe found it premature, because at that time my submarine was just being built.”

— [2]

The first samples of torpedoes (Whitehead torpedoes) were developed by the Englishman Robert Whitehead (1866). On May 29, 1877, during the Battle of Pacocha Bay, a torpedo was used for the first time by the British fleet in combat conditions, but without success - the target managed to evade the hit.

Torpedoes were first successfully used by Russia during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. On January 14, 1878, as a result of an operation carried out under the leadership of Admiral Makarov against the Turkish fleet in the Batum area, two boats, Chesma and Sinop, launched from the mine transport Grand Duke Konstantin, sank the Turkish steamer Intibah. Torpedoes were also actively used during the first Russo-Japanese War.

Apparently, the first guided torpedo was the Brennan Torpedo, developed in 1877.

World War I

“The moment a mine leaves a gun” (1916)
During the First World War, torpedoes were used by the warring parties not only in the sea, but also on rivers: for example, on August 27, 1916, Romanian torpedo boats attacked Austro-Hungarian monitors near the Bulgarian city of Ruse on the Danube. The attack was unsuccessful for the Romanians: the torpedoes missed their targets, and the flagship of the Austrian group, Bodrog, sank one of the attacking boats.

The Second World War

Electric torpedoes
One of the disadvantages of steam-gas torpedoes is the presence of a trace (exhaust gas bubbles) on the surface of the water, unmasking the torpedo and creating the opportunity for the attacked ship to evade it and determine the location of the attackers, therefore, after the First World War, attempts began to use an electric motor as a torpedo engine. The idea was obvious, but none of the states, except Germany, could implement it before the start of World War II. In addition to tactical advantages, it turned out that electric torpedoes are relatively simple to manufacture (for example, the labor costs for the manufacture of a standard German steam-gas torpedo G7a (T1) ranged from 3,740 man-hours in 1939 to 1,707 man-hours in 1943; and for production one G7e electric torpedo (T2) required 1255 man-hours). However, the maximum speed of the electric torpedo was only 30 knots, while the steam-gas torpedo reached a speed of up to 46 knots. There was also the problem of eliminating hydrogen leakage from the torpedo battery, which sometimes led to its accumulation and explosions.

In Germany, an electric torpedo was created back in 1918, but they did not have time to use it in combat. Development continued in 1923, in Sweden. In 1929, the new electric torpedo was ready for mass production, but it was officially put into service only in 1939 under the designation G7e. The work was so secret that the British only learned about it in 1939, when parts of such a torpedo were discovered during an inspection of the battleship Royal Oak, which was torpedoed in Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands.

However, already in August 1941, fully serviceable 12 such torpedoes fell into the hands of the British on the captured U-570. Despite the fact that both Britain and the USA already had prototypes of electric torpedoes at that time, they simply copied the German one and adopted it for service (though only in 1945, after the end of the war) under the designation Mk-XI in British and Mk-18 in the US Navy.

Work on the creation of a special electric battery and electric motor intended for 533 mm torpedoes began in 1932 in the Soviet Union. During 1937-1938. two experimental electric torpedoes ET-45 with a 45 kW electric motor were manufactured. It showed unsatisfactory results, so in 1938 a fundamentally new electric motor was developed with an armature and a magnetic system rotating in different directions, with high efficiency and satisfactory power (80 kW). The first samples of the new electric torpedo were made in 1940. And although the German G7e electric torpedo fell into the hands of Soviet engineers, they did not copy it, and in 1942, after state tests, the domestic ET-80 torpedo was put into service . The first five ET-80 combat torpedoes arrived at the Northern Fleet in early 1943. In total, Soviet submariners used 16 electric torpedoes during the war.

Thus, in reality, in World War II, Germany and the Soviet Union had electric torpedoes in service. The share of electric torpedoes in the ammunition load of Kriegsmarine submarines was up to 80%.

Proximity fuses

Independently of each other, in strict secrecy and almost simultaneously, the navies of Germany, England and the United States developed magnetic fuses for torpedoes. These fuses had a great advantage over simpler contact fuses. Mine-resistant bulkheads located below the armored belt of the ships minimized the destruction caused when a torpedo hit the side. For maximum effectiveness of destruction, a torpedo with a contact fuse had to hit the unarmored part of the hull, which turned out to be a very difficult task. The magnetic fuses were designed in such a way that they were triggered by changes in the Earth's magnetic field under the steel hull of the ship and exploded the torpedo warhead at a distance of 0.3-3.0 meters from its bottom. It was believed that a torpedo explosion under the bottom of a ship caused two or three times more damage than an explosion of the same power at its side.

However, the first German magnetic fuses of the static type (TZ1), which responded to the absolute value of the strength of the vertical component of the magnetic field, simply had to be withdrawn from service in 1940, after the Norwegian operation. These fuses were triggered after the torpedo had passed a safe distance, even in light sea conditions, during circulation, or when the torpedo’s movement in depth was not stable enough. As a result, this fuse saved several British heavy cruisers from certain destruction.

New German proximity fuses appeared in combat torpedoes only in 1943. These were magnetodynamic fuses of the Pi-Dupl type, in which the sensitive element was an induction coil fixedly mounted in the fighting compartment of the torpedo. Pi-Dupl fuses responded to the rate of change in the vertical component of the magnetic field strength and to the change in its polarity under the ship’s hull. However, the response radius of such a fuse in 1940 was 2.5-3 m, and in 1943 on a demagnetized ship it barely reached 1 m.

Only in the second half of the war did the German fleet adopt the TZ2 proximity fuse, which had a narrow response band that lay outside the frequency ranges of the main types of interference. As a result, even against a demagnetized ship, it provided a response radius of up to 2-3 m at angles of contact with the target from 30 to 150°, and with a sufficient travel depth (about 7 m), the TZ2 fuse had practically no false alarms due to rough seas. The disadvantage of the TZ2 was its requirement to ensure a sufficiently high relative speed of the torpedo and the target, which was not always possible when firing low-speed electric homing torpedoes.

In the Soviet Union it was a fuse of the NBC type ( non-contact fuse with a stabilizer

;
This is a generator-type magnetodynamic fuse, which was triggered not by the magnitude, but by the speed of change in the vertical component of the magnetic field strength of a ship with a displacement of at least 3000 tons at a distance of up to 2 m from the bottom). It was installed on 53-38 torpedoes (NBC could only be used in torpedoes with special brass combat charging compartments). Maneuvering devices
During the Second World War, work continued on the creation of maneuvering devices for torpedoes in all leading naval powers. However, only Germany was able to bring prototypes to industrial production ( faT

and its improved version
LuT
).

FaT

The first example of the FaT guidance system was installed on a TI (G7a) torpedo. The following control concept was implemented - the torpedo in the first section of the trajectory moved linearly over a distance from 500 to 12,500 m and turned in any direction at an angle of up to 135 degrees across the movement of the convoy, and in the zone of destruction of enemy ships, further movement was carried out along an S-shaped trajectory (“ snake") at a speed of 5-7 knots, while the length of the straight section ranged from 800 to 1600 m and the circulation diameter was 300 m. As a result, the search trajectory resembled the steps of a ladder. Ideally, the torpedo should have searched for a target at a constant speed across the direction of movement of the convoy. The probability of being hit by such a torpedo, fired from the forward heading angles of a convoy with a “snake” across its course of movement, turned out to be very high.

Since May 1943, the following modification of the FaTII guidance system (the length of the “snake” section is 800 m) began to be installed on TII (G7e) torpedoes. Due to the short range of the electric torpedo, this modification was considered primarily as a self-defense weapon, fired from the stern torpedo tube towards the pursuing escort ship.

LuT

The LuT guidance system was developed to overcome the limitations of the FaT system and entered service in the spring of 1944. Compared to the previous system, the torpedoes were equipped with a second gyroscope, as a result of which it became possible to set turns twice before the start of the “snake” movement. Theoretically, this made it possible for the submarine commander to attack the convoy not from the bow heading angles, but from any position - first the torpedo overtook the convoy, then turned to its bow corners, and only after that began to move in a “snake” across the convoy’s course of movement. The length of the “snake” section could vary in any range up to 1600 m, while the speed of the torpedo was inversely proportional to the length of the section and was for G7a with the initial 30-knot mode set to 10 knots with a section length of 500 m and 5 knots with a section length of 1500 m .

The need to make changes to the design of the torpedo tubes and the computing device limited the number of boats prepared to use the LuT guidance system to only five dozen. Historians estimate that German submariners fired about 70 LuT torpedoes during the war.