North Korean Armed Forces: number of ground forces

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15 years ago, North Korea officially announced the creation of weapons of mass destruction

Photo: AFP PHOTO/KCNA VIA KNS

Exactly 15 years ago (February 10, 2005), North Korea officially announced the creation of nuclear weapons. This caused concern in the United States and Japan and led to the introduction of harsh sanctions against the republic. Restrictive measures did not stop the leadership of the DPRK, and in 2020 the country acquired a ballistic missile, which, according to experts, is capable of delivering a deadly charge to the territory of the United States. However, according to experts interviewed by Russia Today, the likelihood that North Korea will strike first is minimal. How the DPRK created a nuclear missile shield - in the material of RT.

13 years ago, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea officially announced the creation of its own nuclear weapons.

“The negotiation process has reached a dead end due to the hostile anti-Korean policy of the United States. As long as America brandishes a nuclear baton, determined to eliminate our system at any cost, we will expand our stockpile of nuclear weapons to protect the historical choice of our people, freedom and socialism,” the DPRK Foreign Ministry said on February 10, 2005.

When was the DPRK armed forces formed?

The official date of formation of the DPRK Armed Forces is July 27, 1953. Serious military groups, cannon and rocket artillery are deployed on both sides, provocations and propaganda activities are constantly taking place.

July 27

1953 is the official date of formation of the DPRK Armed Forces

Officially, the war between the DPRK and the Kyrgyz Republic ended in 1991. However, nothing has actually changed. It is acceptable to say that the situation has worsened. The Soviet Union collapsed. The Warsaw Pact countries came under the banner of NATO or were destroyed.

Seeing the example of Yugoslavia, the leader of the North Korean people, Kim Jong-un, authorized the development of the DPRK's nuclear program, whose armed forces needed to be strengthened against a possible attack from capitalist countries. This led to tougher sanctions against them.

This is what modern parades look like

Constant sanctions have led to the bleeding of the economy of one of the last communist countries in the world. Only $5 billion is allocated for military needs. Which is prohibitively little. Especially looking at the budget of the Armed Forces of the USA (Almost 1 trillion dollars). It is on this note that it is worth moving on to the history of the formation of the KPA.

See also the article The most powerful armies in the world and their weapons

Special fortification of North Korea

In 2013, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea solemnly celebrated the 60th anniversary of Victory in the Patriotic Liberation War of the Korean People of 1950-1953. In the past, in connection with the adoption of medium-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and the creation of the Strategic Missile Forces in December 2012, it was announced that the Korean People's Army would be reduced by 300 thousand people (out of almost 1200 thousand). The chance to use the newly created troops and their modern weapons could be real in March 2013. Then, in connection with the provocations of the United States and South Korea, the leader of the DPRK, Marshal Kim Jong-un, signed a decree on launching nuclear missile attacks on US targets in Japan, South Korea and on the island of Guam (and, possibly, on US territory). Fortunately, the world did not witness the outbreak of the first nuclear missile war (once again in its history!).

Vehicle inspection point on one of the highways in Pyongyang

A new escalation of tension on the Korean Peninsula has once again spurred interest in North Korea and its military power. The attention of analysts is naturally focused on the latest missile systems of the DPRK, which the country regularly demonstrates at military parades, along with other types of land (and this year, aviation) military equipment. All this indicates that Pyongyang is taking the development of its own armed forces very seriously.

But with all this, they do not forget about simpler, and in the mountainous landscape of North Korea, extremely effective passive means of defense - fortifications. Indeed, reinforced concrete pillboxes and underground galleries, as well as rock shelters for aviation and naval equipment, are a natural attribute of the fortification of the DPRK. But there is also something that is practically not noticed by observers, but is assessed by strategists from extremely opposite points of view...

Road to Panmunjom. The peaceful landscape of the wide road is deceptive - here every stone has its own defensive purpose, and the route itself is a reserve runway for the dispersal of combat aircraft of the DPRK Air Force during a special period

The very geography of North Korea would seem to give more chances to the defender than to the attacker. The ubiquitous mountains created by nature from heavy rocks (such as granite), the extremely rugged coastline and the few (unlike South Korea) valleys attracted the attention of KPA fortifiers back during the 1950-1953 war. It was then that the soldiers of the Korean People's Army opposed the air power of the United States and their allies with “gallery defense” - kilometers of granite galleries dug or gouged into the rock with simple picks, crowbars and shovels - a kind of underground trenches from where soldiers could go to their well-protected positions. It was almost impossible to destroy them from the air, even with multi-ton concrete-piercing and high-explosive bombs, or from the sea by methodical shelling from battleships or heavy cruisers. But capturing it with infantry, even with the support of artillery and armored vehicles, is very difficult. The case of the defense of Height 1027 by a platoon of KPA infantrymen in October 1952, against which an entire US Army regiment was thrown and failed to take it, became known throughout Korea.

Roads outside the major cities of the DPRK are also wide and well-maintained. However, due to their corrugated coating and the fact that the plates are not fitted very tightly to each other, they are a real obstacle for cars - you can’t accelerate on them

The positive effect of gallery defense in the DPRK was taken into account and actively used in the post-war period. Not only strategic control points and individual, particularly important facilities were hidden underground, as was and is practiced in other countries, but also entire military units and almost the entire military industry. It is precisely because of this that virtually nothing is known in the world about the industrial power of the DPRK - analysts operate only with logical constructs based on extremely scanty data. But underground construction did not stop for a week during the 60 post-war years. It is not for nothing that the most difficult (although very common) award in the DPRK is the Order of Miner's Glory, 3 classes, established in 1973.

Koreans are masters of camouflage. Roads - the backbone of North Korea's infrastructure - even in the interior are built in such a way as to hide various objects from prying eyes. Moreover, planting ordinary roadside flowers is often used for this. For example, this is what the road from Pyongyang to Myohan looks like...

However, if the enemy (UN troops - that is, in fact, the US and South Korean armies) begin their offensive in North Korea, the country, transformed thanks to the Songun policy (the priority of the army in socialist construction) into an "impregnable fortress", will most likely find itself “a tough nut to crack” for aggressors. After all, the enemy will be met by the defense of the 4th army corps of the first echelon, which is deeply echeloned and prepared to a depth of 50 km. At the same time, even if it is possible to break through, the obstacles for the interventionists will not simply end.

So, everything in order.

The road to the border with South Korea in the Kaesong area was built in 1992. It cuts through the mountains with tunnels 18 times, with a total length of 7.5 km

All roads in the DPRK are strategic objects. Moreover, all of them, without exception, are built not so much for peacetime, but for a special period. Moreover, all of them are intended not only to provide defense against an external enemy, but also to fend off obvious or hidden opponents of the regime, be it a conscious or accidental person. That is why on the unusually wide roads of North Korea, compared to other countries, there are very often special inspection points for motor vehicles.

The roads themselves were largely built as alternate runways, taxiing stations and parking lots for military aircraft.

Unlike Pyongyang and other large cities of the DPRK, such as Wonsan, where well-paved 4- and 8-lane highways are built, highways outside large administrative centers are built from concrete slabs. Moreover, the plates are specially fitted not very tightly to each other. All this creates additional obstacles for cars and therefore you will not be able to speed up on the roads of the DPRK.

Huge stone pillars specially created to block mountain roads during war. In peacetime, they perform aesthetic and index functions. Such structures must be installed in the mountains, regardless of whether there is a border nearby or not.

But with all this, the routes are built in such a way as to disguise many of the objects through which they pass. Koreans are real masters of camouflage, and for this they use any available materials or create special designs. Paradoxically, ordinary roadside flowers have become one of the most common means of camouflage. They are planted along any, even the most insignificant roads, ennobling and decorating them at the same time. And, naturally, hiding from prying eyes what needs to be hidden. Without exaggeration, we can say that planting roadside and other flowers has become almost a strategic task for ordinary residents of the DPRK.

The DPRK has built and continues to build roads, often even where there are no appropriate conditions for this, but there is a strategic need. In this regard, the pride of all of North Korea was the highway from Kaesong to the border with South Korea, built in 1992 by local residents on the orders of DPRK President Kim Il Sung in record time in inaccessible mountainous terrain. The tunnels, 7.5 kilometers long, cross this 20-kilometer route 18 times.

As we approach the border with South Korea, huge pillars begin to appear on the side of the road. In the event of an enemy attack, they easily fall onto the road, blocking the advance of enemy tanks

Wherever the mountain road goes, by definition it must be an obstacle for uninvited guests. Moreover, difficulties for enemy armored vehicles and vehicles can be created at every step by creating rubble. To do this, special charges are placed in appropriate places and the route of falling rock is calculated. Where there is not enough rock, reinforced concrete structures were erected, which in peacetime perform signposting and aesthetic functions. At “Hour H,” the charges previously placed in them will bring down the holes on the road. Their weight is very significant - much more than the carrying capacity of US and South Korean engineering equipment. Although the “Yankees” and “fascist puppets,” as they argue in the DPRK, apparently will come up with something to unblock the road. To prevent this from happening, artificial structures are combined into a single whole.

The road to the border is well prepared for an enemy attack. Huge concrete cubes are specially designed to block roads during wartime. They are attached to the road wall using special wooden wedges, which are knocked out with a sledgehammer on D-Day.

Border roads are a different matter. Their equipment with special fortification structures is mandatory, no matter what area the road runs through. At the same time, the DPRK remembers very well the events of October 1950, when the Korean People's Army, quickly retreating to the north, did not even have the basic opportunity to gain a foothold and thereby delay the advance of US troops and their allies. At the same time, quite often ordinary residents tried to resist the interventionists. It's no joke, but Seoul held out for 2 weeks!

The photo clearly shows how reinforced concrete cubes and blocks are held against the roadside wall. A huge cube can be brought down onto the road by knocking out a wooden wedge from under its base with a sledgehammer

Transferring the experience of the past to the present, strategists and fortifiers of the DPRK tried to prepare in advance for a hypothetical invasion of the “world gendarme”, giving the opportunity to almost the first patriot they met to detain the aggressor. For this purpose, artificial reinforced concrete blocks of regular geometric shapes have been installed along the roads along the entire 50-km border strip. Some of them are firmly dug into the ground, due to which they are only extravagant and incomprehensible structures at first glance. Others are installed on a specially built roadside wall and quite often, thereby giving away their defensive fortification purpose. At the same time, they rest loosely, but securely, on peculiar pedestals, with the help of wooden pins. In case of danger, anyone knocks out a wooden wedge with one blow of a sledgehammer - and a reinforced concrete pillar or cube of cyclopean dimensions falls onto the road, completely blocking it.

Trees growing between fortification blocks and bicycle stands arranged between them

At the same time, zealous Koreans try to use even purely defensive structures not only for military purposes - fortunately there is no war, and although only a truce remains with their southern neighbor, the country is still developing peacefully. That is why trees are planted in between them. Often the space between the blocks is also used as parking for bicycles.

An over-the-road cafe on the highway near the city of Kaesong. Elements of its durable design will become an obstacle to enemy equipment on this road in wartime

One of the features of the so-called “provincial” architecture of the DPRK is the construction of various types of over-road structures. In this country you will find a variety of over-the-road cafes and even hotels more often than anywhere else. The hardworking residents of North Korea extended this peculiar love to defensive structures. Special over-road bridges, arches and structures at the entrances to military units, administrative points, or simply located in the middle of a variety of roads, even in rural areas, are an everyday reality of the country - in peacetime they are beautiful and unusual, and in military times they are a reliable anti-tank obstacle.

It should be noted that seemingly peaceful over-the-road cafes are built in such a way that in the event of a military danger, their structures destroyed by an internal explosion, albeit not as thoroughly as specially prepared anti-tank bridges, will still block the road for an uninvited and dangerous guest.

Special anti-tank bridges on the roads of the DPRK. In fact, this is an artificial tunnel, the top slab of which, in case of danger, is dropped and blocks the way for tanks

North Korea also has a long coastline facing the Yellow and Sea of ​​Japan (in the DPRK they are called the West and East Korean Seas). At all times, reliable cover of a state's maritime border has been an extremely difficult problem. For the DPRK, the relevance and importance of this task really manifested itself both during the Korean War (suffice it to recall the American landing operations at Incheon and Wonsan), and in the period preceding it (1948-1950) and following it. After all, the “South Korean puppets” tried to send a sea of ​​their agents and saboteurs into the DPRK. There were especially many such cases in the period from 1953 to 1969 (according to official North Korean data - at least a thousand episodes annually).

South Korean soldiers patrol the security fence along the demilitarized zone and the country's sea coast, blocked by barbed wire.

To be fair, it should be noted that official Pyongyang did not disdain this either, creating an entire unique sabotage fleet that has no analogues in the world to carry out such tasks. However, in the West they constantly talk exclusively about North Korean actions to send saboteurs into South Korea, but not vice versa. And they are not shy about asserting the desire of tens of thousands of North Koreans to escape, including by sea, from the “socialist paradise.” They say that for this purpose the coast of the DPRK is closed from the outside world and from its citizens by kilometers of barbed wire. True, Western and pro-Western commentators often forget that it was South Korea that was the first to decide to fence itself off from North Korea with the same kilometers of barbed wire on the sea coast and a 244-kilometer wall along the demarcation line. Moreover, at least the first option was superbly shown in the 2002 South Korean feature film “Coast Guard” directed by Kim Ki-duk, which was also shown on the domestic screen.

Concrete piles of various shapes on the promenade and beach in the Wonsan area

Be that as it may, for the DPRK the task of reliably closing its coast to South Korean agents and saboteurs, as well as preparing it for anti-landing operations, is the most important task. The problem of closing it from home-grown saboteurs in the DPRK is practically not worth it, due to the extremely effective work of special services, a very reliable system of ideological indoctrination of the population, and in general - Korean-style socialism, in principle, is not capable of generating serious opponents of the regime.

Concrete piles of various shapes on the promenade and beach in the Wonsan area

Therefore, the DPRK coastline is closed primarily from the penetration of South Korean intelligence agents in peacetime and to counter the amphibious landing of the United States and its allies in wartime. For this purpose, the entire coast of North Korea is equipped with an artificial embankment, in front of which a double barbed wire fence is installed almost everywhere. In areas that are especially dangerous in peacetime, high-voltage electric current is constantly passed along the external fence or only at night. The fences have passages for local residents, which must be closed at night. Frequently located concrete bumps are used as a basic anti-landing (anti-tank) obstacle.

A natural rock block on the eastern coast of the DPRK is mined with a shaped charge so that in case of danger it will collapse and block the coastal road

Concrete piers of various shapes are installed not only on embankments, but also on beaches. Unlike similar structures on border roads, “beach” bumps are mostly firmly dug into the sand and soil. Their location is specially designed in such a way as to prevent enemy vehicles from leaving the beach. At the same time, the commanders of units and subunits of the 4th Army Corps of the Korean People's Army, responsible for the defense of the coast, are well aware of the location of the indentations and can freely maneuver their tanks and armored personnel carriers between them on the beach. But to prevent the enemy from finding out this secret in peacetime, the KPA does not conduct exercises on the beaches - the crews of combat vehicles train at specially equipped training grounds.

A North Korean farmer collects water from the Yalu River on April 3, 2009 near the Chinese city of Dandong, near the North Korean city of Qingzhouli. The entire space is littered with mock-up firing points, but on D-Day they will bristle with real weapons.

At the same time, literally everything is prepared for anti-landing defense. Any stone structure created by nature is already mined in peacetime and, if necessary, can be undermined, and its remains will thus block the beach or coastal road.

As you can see, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea very seriously assesses the likelihood of a new invasion of its territory by troops of the United States, South Korea and their allies. Therefore, appropriate measures have been taken to prepare passive fortification. We dare to say that in the “Hour” the free movement of interventionists deep into the territory of the DPRK is, if not completely excluded, then to a large extent extremely difficult. Most likely, Washington and Seoul understand this very well and therefore do not escalate the Korean conflict, which could lead to a real war, limiting themselves to constant provocations and saber-rattling during regular military exercises such as “Team Spirit”, etc. And at the same time, they are inflating the myth about the aggressive nature of North Korean leaders, who intended to unify Korea solely through the military seizure of South Korea. This is unlikely to be entirely true, given Pyongyang’s long-term and focused efforts and its numerous initiatives for the peaceful unification of the two Korean states.

Models of artillery pieces made of stones and branches on the banks of the Yalu River from the North Korean side, opposite the Chinese city of Hekou.

It’s another matter that the forced confrontation with the South and the United States almost completely consumes all the DPRK’s resources. A kind of confirmation of this may be the “fortification” of North Korea on a rather long border with the People’s Republic of China. Here we are practically not talking about any capital defensive construction. Despite the fact that Beijing in 2003 concentrated a 150,000-strong army on the border with the DPRK and transferred the protection of its border not to border guards, but to regular army units (in the West they claim that the Chinese political leadership does not exclude the option of occupying the DPRK in an emergency), the border with the PRC, North Korea is practically not strengthened. Its protection, which is provided by the 30,000-strong corps of the DPRK border troops, can, not without reason, be considered more moral than truly prepared.

View of the wall specially built by the Chinese in 2006-2009 on the border between the DPRK and the PRC, designed to prevent the flow of refugees from North Korea to China

Another question is what North Korea is really capable of opposing to a far from socialist China if necessary. The experience of the second half of the 1960s, when Pyongyang’s relations with Maoist China became seriously strained, shows that the Korean People’s Army is capable of qualitatively and seriously strengthening its own border in a matter of weeks. Time will tell how events will develop. Only in the modern period, nuclear China has been protected from the already nuclear DPRK since 2006, immediately after the first nuclear test in the latter, by a concrete fence and barbed wire. For what? Today this question remains open...

Used sources:

In preparing the article, due to its specificity, we mainly used materials from various Internet sites and forums, of which there are several dozen. Among them, I highlight the most popular:

1. Lebedev A. North Korea. Part II. Defense // https://tema. ru/travel/north-korea-2/

2. Sobolev P. Wandering camera - Korea (various albums) // https://www.enlight.ru/camera/dprk/nature.html

Among other things, monographs and articles were used:

1. Lankov A. DPRK: yesterday and today. Informal history of North Korea. - M., 2005 (as well as various publications and interviews of this, the most authoritative specialist on the DPRK in the former USSR);

2. Panin A., Altov V. North Korea: the era of Kim Jong Il at sunset. - M., 2004;

3. Chuprin K. Stalin’s Last Fortress. - M., 2012.

4. 50 years covered in glory. - Pyongyang. Publishing house of literature in foreign languages, 1995.

5. Vinnichenko M. What is stronger: air-ground offensive or ground-underground defense? (from the experience of the Korean War) // Equipment and weapons. - 2001-2002;

6. Markovsky V. “Rooks” of Kim Il Sung // History of Aviation. - 2001. - No. 1. - P. 46-49;

7. Morozov V., Uskov S. Guarding peace and labor // World of Aviation. - 1997. - No. 2. - P. 29-39;

Some of the information was gleaned from personal conversations with representatives of the DPRK.

The article was published in the August 2014 issue of the journal Science and Technology

Found a typo? Select a fragment and press Ctrl+Enter.

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History of the Korean People's Army

Despite its long existence, the history of the KPA is poorly eventful. The figures below are rejected by a number of historians, but they are considered official in North Korea itself.

North Korea - armed forces formed from guerrilla units

The very beginning

Korea was one of the first countries to be invaded by Imperial Japan. Most of the country was occupied. The Japanese killed the entire political and military elite.

See also the article Russian imperial flag and its history

The policy pursued by foreigners on the peninsula most closely resembled assimilation. The cultural layer was gradually destroyed. Instead of Korean, Japanese was taught in schools. Subsequently, this greatly influenced the self-awareness of the Korean people and led to a split into two countries. But not all people accepted such trends.

Part of the population was active in partisan activities.

In 1932, several units united under a single command. One of the young commanders was Kim Il Sung. The group operated with varying degrees of success. The operations were carried out in North Korea, Manchuria and China. The Japanese brutally punished captured partisans, and towards the middle of World War II, members of the AUPA had to retreat beyond the Soviet border.

North Korea on the regional map

After the end of WWII, Korea was divided into two equal parts, North and South. Each zone was under the control of external forces. Above is the USSR, below is the USA. Even then, an invisible confrontation between the two powers began, which subsequently divided the world into 2 camps.

North Korea, whose Army was under the protection of the Soviet Union, turned into a powerful communist state. Kii Il Sung, who was personally acquainted with Stalin and Comrade Mao, was appointed head of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

Comrade Kim Il Sung, head of the DPRK 1948-1994

The state needed its own armed forces. The North Korean army (weapons and personnel) initially began to be formed from volunteer units. Weapons and equipment were supplied from the USSR and China.

By the time the Korean War began, the total number of KPA troops numbered 185,000. In addition to ground units, the naval and air military forces of the DPRK appeared. In addition to the regular army, there were squads capable of facing the bayonet at any time.

Command was exercised by the Headquarters. In order to improve military training, officer schools were organized.

Comrade Kim Il Sung and Stalin

Korean People's Army in the 1950 War

On June 25, 1950, one of the bloodiest conflicts of the second half of the last century began. The KPA invaded the territory of the Republic of Korea and occupied Seoul without much resistance. Within a few weeks, most of its southern neighbor was under the control of North Korean troops. The remnants of the South Korean troops retreated to the Busan Perimeter. It seemed that this was the last line in the history of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Burning American fighter destroyed by the KPA Air Force

However, South Korea had a powerful ally - the United States. In a short time, the American fleet, located near occupied Japan, approached the peninsula. The KPA attack choked. The vector of hostilities has changed. The DPRK army, armed with small arms and light artillery, retreated, suffering losses in manpower and equipment. The US advantage in the air was telling.

See also the article Militarization of Japan and its participation in wars

The combined troops of the Americans and Republicans soon began to approach Pyongyang. The situation with the Busan perimeter was repeated. But China and the USSR came to the aid of Kim Il Sung. The Chinese infantry corps were able to delay the advancing capitalists. This made it possible to increase reserves and reorganize the KPA.

Chinese generals leading the Chinese corps in North Korea

The presence of the USSR was unofficial. Assistance was provided mostly in the form of supplies of weapons and equipment. In addition, aircraft piloted by Soviet pilots actively participated in air battles. This fact gave rise to jokes about the Korean pilots Li Xi Tsin.

In 1952 the front stabilized. No one could break through the enemy's defenses. A positional confrontation began. Moreover, oddly enough, the front line ran along the old border at the 38th parallel.

On July 27, the “hot” stage of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula ended. An agreement was signed to create a demilitarized zone. The reason for the end of the war, in addition to the depletion of human resources and the complete destruction of infrastructure, is the death of Joseph Stalin. After the death of the leader of the USSR, the command decided to withdraw from the conflict. Seeing this, China did not stand up to the Americans alone and provoked the signing of a peace treaty.

Demilitarized zone between North and South Korea

And although the battles stopped, clashes broke out more than once on the new border. The Cold War with South Korea continues. True, there were moments of improving relations.

For example, after the official end of the Korean War in 1991, economic and political ties began to be established. There is a limited ability to cross the demilitarized zone.

The idyll did not last long. The Soviet Union collapsed. The Americans felt impunity. Pro-communist regimes in Eastern Europe and South America began to be overthrown. The United States has not forgotten about the DPRK.

The country was imposed with sanctions. The main reason is the development of nuclear weapons by the DPRK. Moreover, Kim Jong Un tried to establish a dialogue with the “carriers” of democracy, but came across a blank wall.

Unique photo: North Korean soldiers and a Western journalist in the demilitarized zone

North Korea's weapons and nuclear shield development

Seeing that the American side did not want to engage in dialogue and resolve all issues diplomatically, Kim Jong-un accelerated the development of the DPRK’s nuclear program.

Comrade Kim Jong Il: with his encouragement, the DPRK began to develop nuclear technology

The process of creating our own nuclear bomb continued, despite increasingly stringent economic restrictions and trade bans.

Even in this situation, the DPRK government tried to come to an agreement with its opponents. At the beginning of the 2000s, they even managed to conclude a pact on the denuclearization of the peninsula. The Korean side stops developing nuclear weapons. The response step is the lifting of sanctions. Everything went well for a while. The restrictions have been lifted.

2013

this year North Korea withdrew from the international treaty on nuclear disarmament and deterrence

The economy began to grow, and with it the Korean People's Army. However, less than a few years later, the United States reintroduced the ban. This became the reason for the DPRK's withdrawal from the international treaty on nuclear disarmament and deterrence in 2013. Work on the weapon continued.

Since 1990, Pyongyang has tested its nuclear device more than once. Of course, North Korea's nuclear weapons are not perfect and are inferior in power to those of the United States or Russia. But an atom remains an atom. Tensions in the region are constantly growing. In addition to warheads, launch vehicles are being tested. The latter are capable of carrying a warhead at a distance of up to 3,500 km.

Current Marshal of the DPRK Kim Jong-un

The year 2016 was marked by elections in the United States, with Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump rushing to power. The last one won. One of the election promises was to resolve the Korean crisis.

In 2020, aircraft carriers once began conducting exercises near North Korean territory. However, things did not go further than maneuvers. Despite the increasing number of missile tests and the bickering between Trump and Kim on Twitter.

In 2020, the winter sports team was invited to participate in the 2020 Olympics. Winter sports in the UK are not very developed, so there was a temporary unification of the Korean people under a single flag. Possession of a nuclear arsenal provides its own benefit.

Donald Trump. Perhaps the main opponent of Comrade Kim on Twitter

The grin of the “paper tiger”

The potential nuclear threat has been assessed differently by North Korean leaders over the years. At one time, the country's leadership did not attach much importance to this. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung believed that a nuclear bomb was a “paper tiger.”

Work on creating North Korea's nuclear infrastructure began shortly after Kim Il Sung learned that the United States was planning to drop seven nuclear bombs on the capital of the republic during the 1950-1953 Korean War. Already in 1956, cooperation began between the USSR and the DPRK in this area, at first it consisted of training specialists.

“Nuclear weapons appeared in North Korea almost immediately after the end of the Korean War. Even then, it became obvious that North Korea needed to maximize its defense capabilities,” said Irina Lantsova, an expert on North and South Korea, associate professor of the Department of American Studies at St. Petersburg State University.

According to Yuri Tavrovsky, a professor at the Russian Peoples' Friendship University, the main reason for the start of North Korea's nuclear development was "a deep sense of threat from Korea's traditional enemies, such as Japan and the United States, as well as the desire to rely on its own forces, the Juche policy."

The Koreans decided not to rely on the nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union and China, Tavrovsky believes. In addition, in his opinion, at that time the memory of the destructive and bloody war was still fresh.

“They [the North Korean authorities] came to the conclusion that only nuclear weapons can guarantee the non-repetition of war using conventional methods, which are extremely destructive, and they obviously believed that nuclear weapons would not be used, but would be a good defense,” the expert believes.

Gradually, North Korea acquired the necessary infrastructure and already in 1974 joined the IAEA. At the same time, work began on Pyongyang’s creation of its own nuclear weapons. China, in particular, provided significant assistance in this by allowing North Korean scientists to visit its facilities.

The success of the DPRK, according to Tavrovsky, was facilitated by two main factors: “overexertion of the economic, technical, scientific forces of North Korea itself,” as well as “conscious and unconscious transfers of technology by other countries, such as the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China and, possibly, Pakistan.” . At the last stage, already in our time, the Koreans bought technology or specialists from Ukraine, from Dnepropetrovsk, where it is located, which produced the heaviest liquid rockets for the Soviet Union, which are known in the West as “Satan”.

In 1985, counting on USSR assistance in the construction of a nuclear power plant, Pyongyang, under pressure from Moscow, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the early 1990s, IAEA inspectors visited the country frequently, and the results of their inspections turned out to be ambiguous.

In the spring of 1993, the DPRK's intention to withdraw from the Treaty was announced, and in the summer of 1994 the country left the IAEA. Subsequently, it became known that it was in 1994 that the United States almost attacked the reactor in Yongbyon, the largest nuclear facility in North Korea. However, after analyzing the inevitable casualties, Clinton abandoned this idea.

After the visit of former US President Jimmy Carter to the DPRK, the countries managed to sign the so-called framework agreement at the end of 1994. According to this document, North Korea, in particular, committed itself to stop building and using uranium enrichment infrastructure and removing plutonium from reactors, removing enriched nuclear fuel outside the DPRK and dismantling all facilities in one way or another related to nuclear weapons.

The United States was supposed, in accordance with the agreement, to supply fuel oil to North Korea and build two much larger light water reactors to replace the Yongbyon reactor, which was shut down. They could not be used to produce nuclear fuel.

Organizational structure of the North Korean Armed Forces

The main governing body of the KPA is the GKO (Civil Defense Committee). All other units are included in its composition: Navy, Armed Forces, Naval Forces, Missile Forces, People's Militia, etc. The State Defense Committee is chaired by Marshal Kim Jong-un. He is also the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the North Korean Armed Forces, capable of declaring mobilization and martial law.

Structurally, the waxes of North Korea consist of:

Other armed groups:

• connections of the Ministry of Public Security;
• law enforcement agencies of the Ministry of State Security;
• militia Workers 'and Peasants' Red Guard;
• youth Red Guard;
• other units.

The total number of regular waxers is approaching 1.2 million people. Moreover, most of the armed forces are concentrated near the southern border. If necessary, it is possible to mobilize another 4 million people. However, as a last resort, the entire combat-ready contingent is drafted into the army. According to rough estimates, 10 million. The figure is impressive, considering that the DPRK is home to 24 million people in total.

Coat of arms of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Guard (Civil Self-Defense)

Northern Lights: North Korea's nuclear weapons guarantee the security of Vladivostok

- Daria Alexandrovna, from the name of the society of which you are the vice-president - the study of the ideas of Juche and the DPRK - it follows that you know about this country, its leaders and, perhaps, even about the psychology of these leaders a little more than many others. Therefore, the immediate question is: do you think the North Korean leadership will keep its promise to start a nuclear war if, as they say in Pyongyang, “American provocations” continue?

— This issue needs to be considered from a completely different angle. Yes, the People's Korea has long declared that it has nuclear weapons. But it is seen solely as a weapon of deterrence. Of course, if the United States, which has already spoken more than once about the need to launch a preventive strike on North Korea, provokes this situation, then nothing is ruled out. But as an optimist, I hope that things will not go beyond rhetoric. By the way, unlike the United States, neither the DPRK nor other countries armed with nuclear weapons have ever used them in their history. At the same time, the USA declares a certain exclusive right to carry out missionary activities to force everyone to American-style democracy. Life shows that the only opportunity to defend the country's independence in the current conditions is the possession of nuclear weapons.

Photo: facebook.com/OKP

“But the whole point is that the leaders of the DPRK are also threatening to deliver not a retaliatory strike, but a warning strike.” And not just any kind, but a nuclear one. According to statements made in Pyongyang, this will be done at the “slightest sign” that the Americans are preparing an attack. And the concept of “the slightest signs” can be interpreted very broadly.

“No matter what threatening words were contained in the press releases of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, the matter never went beyond words. One should also take into account the fact that the forces are completely unequal. Koreans are forced, as they say, to rattle words. It makes no sense for them to talk about a retaliatory strike, since compared to the United States, the DPRK is a very small country with incomparably less military potential. After the US strike, there may be no response.

— As far as we know, the power of the first person in the DPRK, which passed to him virtually by inheritance, does not know any restrictions: the leader there is actually deified. And the logic of a person with unlimited power is very difficult to calculate. What if something goes wrong in Comrade Kim’s head, as they say, and he gives the order to bomb American bases or the bases of their allies?

- Well, about unlimited power - this is a strong exaggeration. One should not confuse propaganda, which is largely directed inside the country, with the real situation. Just like his father and grandfather, Kim Jong Un is bound by collective leadership. There is a parliament, there is a government. There is a party elite, and not some kind given by God, but formed on the basis of grassroots inner-party democracy. Finally, there are generals. The North Korean generals we see on TV are not decorative figures, hung with awards and badges and without a voice of their own. This is truly the country's military elite, enjoying great influence, especially in matters of war and peace. Of course, the role of the first person should not be underestimated either. But the assertions that Kim Jong-un rules alone are very far from the truth.

— There are other opinions about the level of development of democracy in the DPRK, but I won’t argue with you. I will only note that in our own interests, it would probably be better if this country did not have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. With all due respect to its sovereignty and identity.

- I completely disagree with you. It is precisely this approach—dividing countries into “right” and “wrong”—that is completely undemocratic. Americans consider themselves white people who have the right to produce any weapon and use it at their own discretion, and the rest as untermensch who have no rights. I am in favor of nuclear weapons being available to any nation that is at a certain level of scientific and technological development and is capable of producing these weapons.

— Actually, I proceed from the fact that if an atomic bomb explodes on the Korean Peninsula, a radioactive cloud will very quickly cover Vladivostok. Do you believe that the principles of global justice are higher than considerations of national security?

- God be with you, one thing does not contradict the other. It is precisely the presence of nuclear weapons in the DPRK that guarantees that there will be no radioactive cloud over Vladivostok. And if the military capabilities of the United States and North Korea were comparable, the danger of war in this region would be even less.

- God grant that you are right. Now let’s talk about how North Korea lives today. Due to the closed nature of the country, this issue is quite debatable, but for you, it seems, there are no secrets. “The level of technological development and, most importantly, personal qualities in the DPRK have reached unprecedented heights,” you assert in your recent interview. What is this assessment based on? And what is “personal quality”?

— Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish between the standard of living and quality of life. These concepts are somewhat related, but not linearly. The standard of living is purely quantitative indicators. GDP per capita, average per capita income, and so on. But if a person receives a large salary, this does not mean a high quality of life. Especially if more than half of your earnings goes to taxes and rent. This concept includes, for example, whether a person has a guaranteed job, the opportunity to receive treatment, relax, and become familiar with cultural values. The standard of living in North Korea is, of course, low. It cannot be high: for decades the country has developed separately, relying mainly on its own strength. But at the starting point of this development, at the end of World War II, 97 percent of the population were poor peasants who could neither read nor write. And now it is a country of, let’s say, an average level of development. Even by global standards. Infant mortality rates there are practically zero - lower than in the more technologically advanced South Korea. Nurseries, kindergartens, all kinds of creative houses for children... And all this, unlike South Korea, is completely free.

- Why do people flee from North to South, and not vice versa?

— Dissidents, yes, there are. But there is nothing unusual about this - they exist in every country. The only thing I disagree with the policy of the North Korean leadership is that, it seems to me, there is no need to prevent this, to keep people. If exit from the DPRK was free, no one would pay any attention to the emigrants. However, North Koreans still have the opportunity to travel abroad. Several hundred thousand citizens of the DPRK regularly travel to China and our Far East for seasonal work. And recently, they can also go on tourist trips. Tourists from the DPRK can, for example, be met today in Moscow. You can visit North Korea itself without any big problems. So Mansky (Vitaly Mansky, documentary director - “MK” ) went and even shot a whole film there (“In the Rays of the Sun.” - “MK” ). I certainly don't like this film. But the main thing is that no one stopped him from filming. That is, the idea of ​​North Korea as a closed country is slowly turning into a myth.

“However, according to information coming from this country, the dissidents remaining in the DPRK are not to be envied. Freethinking is punishable by being sent to a forced labor camp. Is not it?

- No not like this. Of course, if people break the law, they are dealt with according to the law. But if this is just a dissident who has not committed any offenses, then, of course, he will not fall into any camps.

— Do you want to say that any person in North Korea can publicly declare “down with Kim Jong-un!” and nothing will happen to him for this?

- Don't know. I am not aware of such a practice. I think, however, that those people who want to publicly say something bad about Kim Jong-un do so after they leave the country. In a safe area. Well, in the kitchen you can really say anything. Just like we did in Soviet times.

— It is known that structures similar to your society exist in many countries of the world. According to rumors, they are sponsored by the DPRK embassies. Are these just rumors?

— Such societies do not receive direct funding. But, let’s say, when our guys are invited to a country, their stay there is at the expense of the host country. We pay for the trip ourselves. In principle, this is common practice for any trips abroad by invitation. But perhaps Koreans invite us more often than others. In addition, the embassy supplies us with literature free of charge. First of all, these are, of course, the works of Korean leaders. Meetings of our society are also often held on the territory of the embassy. Actually, this is where “sponsoring” ends. We exist as a public initiative; we are not paid any money for our activities.

— Judging by some of your statements, you and your like-minded people have set themselves the ultimate task of transferring the North Korean experience to Russian soil. Am I wrong?

— It depends what you mean by the North Korean experience. We are developing in completely different conditions... But the principle of self-reliance is a very useful principle. Today we have, let’s say, a soft version of the sanctions imposed against us by the West. They are very gentle, “herbivores”. But the situation can change at any moment. In a certain sense, the Juche idea suits us even more than North Korea itself, since in terms of resources we are a self-sufficient country and can truly be completely economically independent.

— In your recent congratulations on behalf of the RKSM to the leadership and people of the DPRK on the occasion of the 105th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung, you wished the North Koreans, among other things, “loyalty to the leader.” Do you really think this is a virtue?

— On the one hand, there is a certain diplomatic protocol, a form for drawing up such congratulations. It is quite established. On the other hand, I believe that if a leader has unshakable authority in his country, then this is very good and, as they say, God willing.

- So, this recipe can be applied to us too?

— Well, if I thought that this was applicable to our country, then I would probably be in United Russia, and not in RKSM. Not every leader deserves such worship. Kim Il Sung was, from my point of view, a political genius and, of course, rightfully enjoyed such respect. Well, the fact that today the DPRK is alive and has positive dynamics speaks of the success and effectiveness of those who lead the country today.

— Do you think our leaders have not yet earned loyalty?

— Our current leaders have not yet brought our economy, in the absolute majority of indicators, even to the level of 1991. The only thing we have caught up with and surpassed is raw material exports.

— Be fair: at least we are ahead of North Korea.

— Comparable things should be compared. North Korea in 1995 must be compared with North Korea today. And we will see positive dynamics and development. Comparing North Korea to us is as stupid as comparing us to the United States.

FROM THE MK DOSSIER

Mitina Daria Aleksandrovna, Russian left-wing political figure. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Youth Union (RKSM). Deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation of the second convocation (1995–1999), was a member of the Communist Party faction.

Armament of the DPRK

North Korea has an excellently developed military-industrial complex. The lion's share of the country's budget is invested in this industry. The industry is capable of producing any type of necessary equipment and equipment, except military aircraft. The production process cycle is completely closed and does not depend on external supplies.

The problem with the North Korean economy is the total embargo.

The DPRK does not have its own sources of gas and oil.

Therefore, we have to buy from our neighbors. Mainly from China.

Contrary to public opinion, the DPRK is not a country closed to visitors. Tourists often come there, and residents of the state periodically work in Chinese factories and simply travel.

North Korean Ground Forces

The total number of ground forces is 1.02 million people. For the most part, conscript soldiers were drafted into the army at the age of 17. The duration of service varies - 5-12 years. The group includes 20 corps: 12 infantry, 2 artillery, a capital defense corps, 4 armored and motorized.

The KPA ground forces have a large number of cannon and rocket artillery. For the most part, all troops are deployed along the border with the Kyrgyz Republic. Moreover, some can fire at Seoul and its suburbs.

Weapons used by the DPRK ground forces:

Despite the hype surrounding the DPRK, the KPA ground units are intended to defend the country’s borders. Most of the ground forces are stationed around the 38th parallel and consist of artillery. In general, along the entire demilitarized zone, on the SK side, long-term firing positions, bunkers, trenches and other fortifications have been built.

Navy

The KPA fleet is divided into Eastern and Western. Each consists of warships of different classes, submarines, cargo and landing ships. The main task of the Navy is to protect state borders and assist ground forces conducting ground operations. At the same time, the transfer of the fleet from the western sea to the eastern sea and back is impossible due to geographical features.

The fleet is equipped with the following vessels:

One of the main doctrines of the DPRK fleet is launching missile attacks from small ships. This “mosquito” fleet tactic is used by many countries with limited budgets. Unlike ground units, service lasts 5-10 years.

Air Force

North Korean military aviation is located at 70 airfields . The main part of the sites is built around the capital. This ensures that the city is protected from attacks by enemy aircraft. The helicopters in service are Soviet-Chinese production and captured helicopters captured during the Korean War.

See also the article What is a hydrogen bomb and how does it work?

Equipment used by the KPA Air Force:

North Korean Air Defense Forces

Strategic and tactical missile forces

The DPRK has successfully mastered the production of missiles of various classes. The production cycle is carried out entirely by the military-industrial complex of North Korea. The first versions of missiles were developed with an eye on Soviet projects.

Subsequently, part of the developments was purchased from Ukraine (according to rumors). Ballistic intercontinental missiles capable of carrying a nuclear charge are currently being actively tested.

Types of missiles:

• TBRMD – Short-range tactical ballistic missile.
• MRBM is a medium-range ballistic missile.
• ICBM – intercontinental ballistic missile.

North Korean nuclear forces

The development of atomic weapons started back in 1990. This is evidenced by a memo from the Chairman of the USSR KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov. The paper talked about the successful development of the atomic bomb and plans to test the device.

The nuclear program was developed at a research institute near the city of Yongbyon. Presumably, analogues of Pakistani P-2 centrifuges were used to enrich uranium. This made it possible to increase the production of weapons-grade uranium to 60 kg per year.

Launch vehicle tests conducted by North Korea

• In 2013, the third test of a nuclear bomb with a yield of up to 10 kilotons took place. According to experts, at that time the DPRK already had up to 15 combat devices and carriers for them.
• On January 6, 2020, the 4th test occurred. According to official sources, the force of the detonated charge was equivalent to a hydrogen bomb. Another wave of panic swept across the world. Especially among the population of nearby countries.
• On September 9, 2020, the 5th test was carried out. The main goal is an attempt to stop military exercises between the United States and the Republic of Korea. And also the liquidation of the American military base in South Korea.

Delivered to the White House

The DPRK began developing a means of delivering a nuclear charge in 1988. The development of the Taepodong-1 medium-range ballistic missile took 10 years - the first launch was made in 1998.

From 1999 to 2005, North Korea observed a unilateral moratorium on missile tests, introduced following negotiations with the Clinton administration in exchange for food aid.

“The dialogue with the United States ceased in 2001 with the coming to power of the Bush administration, which means that we have the right to resume missile tests,” read the text of the statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry, which was published on March 3, 2005.

In subsequent years, Pyongyang continued launching rockets, and at the end of 2012, North Korea became a space power, successfully launching the Gwangmyongsong-3 satellite into orbit.

In 2020, the launch of the Hwasong-14 missile, which fell in the Sea of ​​Japan, became the reason for convening the UN Security Council. Soon, another launch was made of the North Korean Hwasong-12 missile, which fell into the Pacific Ocean, flying over the Japanese island of Hokkaido.

The United States is particularly concerned about the latest version of the Hwasong, the Hwasong-15, which, according to experts, can hit any target in the United States.

Today, North Korea is also a missile exporter. Among its largest buyers are the UAE, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and Yemen. In addition, the Iranian carriers were allegedly made on the basis of the North Korean Taepodong-2.

From the United States, pressure on North Korea has intensified with the rise to power of Donald Trump, who has already threatened the DPRK with complete destruction. Photo facebook.com/WhiteHouse

KPA ranks

Marshals

• Generalissimo;
• Marshal of the DPRK;
• Marshal of the KPA;
• Vice Marshal.

Kim Il Sung – 1st Generalissimo of the DPRK

Generality

On the left is Zhukov, on the right are the DPRK generals. Rate the number of awards

Senior officers

Junior officers

North Korean military uniform

NCOs

Soldier composition

A little about the influence of the USSR on the DPRK

The Soviet Union supplied only anti-aircraft missile systems and short-range tactical missiles to the DPRK - this was enough both to ensure its own security and to partially satisfy Pyongyang’s ambitions. In 1965, 8 Luna-2 missile launchers arrived in the DPRK, from which they created the first separate missile regiment in the North Korean army. These missiles could only hit targets at a distance of up to 60 km - enough to shell the southern capital of Seoul, the center of which is only about 50 km from the border.

Almost ten years later, in 1974, South Korea began developing its own Baekkom missile. South Korea sought to create a retaliatory weapon - after all, Pyongyang was inaccessible to the army of the Republic of Korea, while Seoul was in the fire zone of North Korean Luna-2 complexes. The Pakkom program was subsequently curtailed under pressure from Washington, which was largely guided by the same considerations as Moscow - reluctance to put powerful offensive weapons in the hands of an unpredictable ally. However, Pyongyang began to prepare a “response” to the South Korean “response”. At the same time, the DPRK could only rely on the efforts of its own engineers, who began creating their own missile system in 1975. It was decided to take the Luna-M unguided solid-propellant rocket, which entered service with the Soviet Army in 1964, as the basis. Luna-M rockets could deliver a charge weighing up to 450 kg over a distance of up to 70 km. By that time, Moscow had already supplied similar missile systems to Egypt and Syria. North Korea reached an agreement with Egypt, which sold it several launchers and several dozen missiles. These missiles were copied by North Korean engineers and went into production in the early 1980s.

The purchase and copying of Luna-M was only a test of strength. In 1980, the DPRK bought a much more serious system from Egypt - the Soviet R-17 liquid-fuel missile, known in the West as Scud-B. This missile has a range of 300 km and is capable of delivering a warhead weighing up to 1000 kg to a target. By 1984, North Korean engineers had completed copying the R-17 and tested it. The North Korean copy of the missile is known as Hwasong-5. In its first version, it was an exact copy of the Soviet prototype, but over time, Korean engineers managed to slightly increase the missile's range.

In 1988-1990, Hwasong-5 was seriously modernized. The new missile, called Hwasong-6, with a warhead weight of 700 kg, had a range of 500 km. This finally made it possible to satisfy the main requirement of the North Korean military - the ability to hit targets throughout South Korea. In total, the DPRK produced from 600 to 1000 Hwasong missiles. About half of them were exported.

Pyongyang especially values ​​the latter circumstance, because the missile program has unexpectedly become one of its few sources of direct foreign exchange earnings. After all, today North Korea is one of the few countries in the world that truly pursues its own foreign policy, maximally independent of Washington, Moscow, or “all sorts of” international treaties. And at the same time, the country is the owner of missile technology. It is these that North Korea, according to statements from both the American, Chinese, and intelligence services of other states, is now ready to sell to anyone who can pay well, but they cannot purchase missile technology or finished products anywhere else (mainly due to numerous sanctions and American embargoes).

The first “official” North Korean buyers were the Iranians, who purchased a batch of Hwasong-5 missiles in the summer of 1987. In Iran they became known as "Shahab-1". The Iranian army used these missiles extensively during the war with Iraq, conducting about 80 combat launches against Iraqi cities. Another batch of Hwasong-5 was sold to the UAE. Hwasong-6 was supplied to Iran, Syria, Vietnam, and Libya. Note that from this list, only Vietnam does not currently fall into the American category of “rogue countries” that threaten the national security of the United States.

In the DPRK itself, a separate missile regiment is armed with Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6 missiles. In 2000, it included 28-30 launchers. The regiment is stationed in the town of Chiha-li near Pyongyang, approximately 50 km from the border, and reports directly to the Supreme Command.

Missile power

Thus, by 1990, North Korea could officially call itself a “missile power” - engineers were able to develop and quickly put relatively modern missile systems into service with the DPRK army. Under these conditions, it was decided to take the next step - move to long-range missiles. This was also necessary because, from the mid-eighties, in Korea, according to Western observers, work was actively underway on the creation of nuclear weapons, which needed delivery vehicles.

The first North Korean missile system that could hit targets outside the Korean Peninsula proper was the Nodong-1. The first test launch in 1990 ended in disaster - the rocket exploded on the launch pad, but 5 subsequent launches in 1993 were successful. After testing, the rocket went into production. At the beginning of 2000, according to Western data, from 75 to 100 Nodon-1 missiles were produced, with which one separate missile regiment was armed. Together with a separate missile regiment (Hwasong-6 missiles), it is part of a separate missile division of the Supreme Command created in the 1990s. Given the long range of the missiles, the battalion is deployed in the northern part of the country, near the Chinese border - much to the displeasure of the PRC.

With a range of 1,300 km and a warhead weight of 700-100 kg, the Nodon-1 is capable of striking Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei or Khabarovsk, although its main potential targets are American bases in Japan. “Nodong-1” is an enlarged version of “Hwasong-6” approximately one and a half times. The missile could potentially carry a nuclear warhead.

The Nodong-1 production technology was transferred to Pakistan, where an analogue of the North Korean system, the Guri missile, was assembled. Not only is it an exact copy of the Nodon-1, but it also includes components and components supplied from the DPRK. It was these missiles that became the main carriers of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. Another buyer of the system is believed to have been Iran, in which Nodon-1 became known as Shehab-3.

Finally, in the mid-1990s, work began on multi-stage missiles that can already be considered intercontinental. As a result, the Taepodong-1 (range 2500 km) and Taepodong-2 (7000 km) missiles appeared. Taepodong-1 is a combination of two already proven missile systems. The more powerful Nodong-1 is used as the first stage, and Hwasong-6 as the second. In the Taepodong-2 rocket, the modernized version of Nodong-1 was already used as the second stage. The first stage was specially developed. Note that it was the Taepodong-1 test in 1998 that horrified the whole of Japan - the missile flew through the entire territory of this country and showed that Japanese air defense systems “missed” it.

The Taepodong-2 rocket is known for serving as the basis for the first North Korean space rocket, which was launched on August 31, 1998 from the Musan-ri test site on the coast of the Sea of ​​Japan. As reported, a third, solid propellant, was added to the standard two stages, which was supposed to launch an artificial satellite into orbit. The rocket launched at 12:07, and soon the North Korean state news agency CATAK notified the world of another triumph of Juche science and technology - the launch of a North Korean satellite. According to him, the satellite entered orbit and began performing its main task - broadcasting revolutionary songs about the “beloved leader” Kim Jong Il. True, for example, the United States still doubts such North Korean successes: according to their data, the satellite did not enter orbit and fell into the Pacific Ocean 4,000 km east of Korea.

In many ways, Washington considers reports of North Korea’s readiness to adopt the latest ballistic missiles with a range of 4 thousand km to be a bluff. The experts' arguments go something like this. In order to create such a rocket, as the experience of the USA and USSR shows, it is necessary to carry out a significant cycle of flight tests. At the same time, as practice shows, almost half of the first ten launches end in accidents, which is perfectly recorded by space means. In addition, Washington is confident that the DPRK does not have a developed system for tracking missile flights, without which it is virtually impossible to identify and eliminate the causes of such accidents and design and manufacturing defects.

However, even an unsuccessful attempt to launch its own satellite demonstrated that the DPRK actually has missile technology, even if it is not yet sufficient for its own launch into space. It also showed the ambitions of North Korea. Let us note at the same time that Washington is either disingenuous or really believes and fears that North Korea and other states cooperating with it in the field of missile technology and missile technology are capable of achieving great success in this area. In any case, let us recall that it was the North Korean missile program, and a little more generally - possible missile attacks on US territory by “rogue countries” - that became the official reason for Washington to create the country’s missile defense system and a way out of the “cornerstone of strategic stability” - Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972.

Pyongyang's nuclear club

The nuclear program of North Korea also fits into the same pattern - threats and more threats. By and large, even less is known about it than about the rocket one. However, with the advent of the missile program, the development of nuclear weapons became one of the main goals of the DPRK.

This was facilitated to a certain extent by the agreement signed in 1956 between the DPRK and the USSR on cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Dozens of North Korean specialists underwent training and internships at scientific institutes of the USSR and China. In 1964, with the help of the Soviet Union, a research center was founded in Yenben, where, along with work in the field of nuclear energy, military applied research soon began to be conducted. The following year, a 5-megawatt research reactor supplied from the USSR was put into operation there. At this point, according to official statements by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, cooperation between Moscow and the DPRK in the nuclear field ended and has not yet been restored.

In the early 1980s, construction began on another nuclear reactor in Yenben, with a capacity of 50 megawatts. Construction of a 200-megawatt gas-graphite reactor in the Tongcheon area was also launched. These reactors, according to experts, have a dual purpose: to generate electricity and produce weapons-grade plutonium. The Ministry of Atomic Industry, which is part of the State Administrative Council (Cabinet), is directly responsible for the nuclear program of the DPRK.

It is known that at present, when the design of the simplest nuclear charges is no longer a secret, a critical element of military nuclear programs is the production of the required amount of fissile materials - highly enriched uranium or plutonium. For its nuclear program, the DPRK chose plutonium as the basic fissile material. Therefore, the main criterion in assessing the degree of progress of the North Korean nuclear program remains the answer to the question: how much plutonium does the DPRK already have and what are the prospects for its production in the coming years?

The highly closed nature of North Korean society—remember the “black spot”—does not make it possible to answer this question unambiguously. US intelligence agencies publish one piece of information, the Russians publish another, and the Chinese publish a third. Sometimes testimonies of North Korean specialists who have left the country become known to the world community. In 1994, statements by nuclear scientist Kim Dai Ho, who fled the DPRK, were made public in Japan that his country possessed 12 kilograms of plutonium back in 1988. Experts from leading countries of the world treated these assessments rather cautiously. However, most of them agree on the main thing: in North Korea for many years, until recently, research has been carried out on the development of nuclear weapons and practical work on the accumulation of plutonium reserves.

Over the course of almost thirty years, the DPRK has built an extensive nuclear infrastructure, including both research and development and production facilities. In fact, the main center for the design and production of nuclear weapons is the Atomic Energy Research Center in Yongbyon. It includes: the Institute of Nuclear Physics, the Institute of Nuclear Electronics, the Institute of Isotopes, the Institute of Radiation Chemistry, a critical assembly with a power of 0.1 MW, a reactor with a power of 5 MW, a reactor with a thermal power of 8 MW, a reactor with a power of 50 MW, a radiochemical laboratory, a processing plant isotopes, a nuclear fuel plant and an explosive testing site. In the DPRK there are both operating uranium mines and uranium processing enterprises. An analysis of the DPRK's nuclear infrastructure convinces us that work on the creation of nuclear weapons is being carried out on a broad front, covering all aspects of this complex scientific and technical problem. At the same time, attention is drawn to the fact that large research centers have been created in the country, which, apparently, have the ability to conduct not only theoretical and applied research, but also the development of warhead designs.

Observers say Pyongyang's goal is to become a nuclear power. Having the fifth largest army in the world, this country, however, does not play any political role on the world stage and is practically in political and economic isolation. Therefore, Kim Jong Il hopes for an increase in the international rating of the DPRK with its nuclear status. However, Pyongyang is aware that the discovery of direct military preparations could lead to the DPRK sharing the fate of Iraq even before acquiring nuclear weapons. And, most likely, no one will stand up for him. Because no one needs North Korea with nuclear weapons in the region.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

Ideological work

Due to numerous sanctions imposed, North Korea is in a constant economic crisis. The economy is developing weakly. Most of the funds go to the army. Since 1990, the DPRK has followed a policy of giving priority to military industry and the armed forces.

This allowed us to concentrate on developing a nuclear program and ensure our sovereignty. What such a policy will lead to in the future is unknown.

Military parade in Pyongyang

Dashing zeros

In 2001, George W. Bush came to power in the United States and included North Korea on the list of “rogue countries.” Under his rule, the promised reactors were not built, but the demands on North Korea grew more and more. Already in 2002, the United States announced Pyongyang’s failure to comply with the framework agreement and accused North Korea of ​​continuing uranium enrichment. At the end of the year, North Korea expelled IAEA employees from its territory and announced the continuation of work on its nuclear program.

The result of a new round of confrontation between the United States and the DPRK in January 2003 was Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The six-party negotiations between the DPRK, China, the USA, Russia, South Korea and Japan, which began in the summer of 2003, also led nowhere. In 2004, North Korea refused to participate in them, demanding clarification regarding South Korea’s nuclear program, which, as it turned out, had been ongoing for 4 years.

On February 10, 2005, North Korea announced the creation of nuclear weapons, but conducted its first test only in October 2006. North Korea is known to have tested several new weapons from 2006 to 2017.

In 2020, Pyongyang announced the test of a thermonuclear charge - the so-called hydrogen bomb.

Experts note that the development of the North Korean nuclear program was a necessary measure.

“After Iraq, and then after Libya and Syria, it became clear that there were no other ways to defend sovereignty. If North Korea did not have a nuclear program, it is likely that it would have already been bombed,” emphasized Konstantin Asmolov, an employee of the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

According to the expert, North Korea exists in an unfriendly environment; for example, from the point of view of South Korea, the DPRK does not exist as a state. Formally, the South Korean Constitution also applies to the northern territories.

Advantages and disadvantages of KNA

Advantages

• high morale. The ideological indoctrination of the population is on a grand scale. Parades are held, children imbibe the Juche ideal from an early age. All this led to the unity of the people and the willingness to stand to the end;
• number. Regular army - 1.2 million, reserve - 4 million, mobilization potential - 10 mln;
• strong barrel and rocket artillery.
• presence of a submarine fleet;
• strong military-industrial complex;
• presence of nuclear weapons;
• global fortification of the country.

The pride and beauty of the KPA is self-propelled artillery

North Korea may have tested laser weapons

The old law of intelligence: if there is no direct information, work on indirect information. When there is not enough indirect data, work from exclusion. Tsargrad tried to apply this approach together with one of the leading Russian experts on North Korea.

Kim Jong-un saw it, but is not telling yet

According to the South Korean news agency Yonhap, which, in turn, referred to the North Korean media, some tests of “high-tech weapons” took place in the DPRK, which was attended by the head of state, Kim Jong-un himself. He found that everything went well.

The testing of high-tech tactical weapons was carried out successfully, with full compliance with regard to its advanced performance,

- said a statement from the DPRK Central Television.

The North Korean media is not known for its openness, if not chattiness. Therefore, all that was said about the new “high-tech weapon” was that it was “ultra-modern” and had been developed over a long period of time. The test took place at the National Defense Institute test site and was attended by a North Korean head of state for the first time since November 2020, when he watched the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. And he also said that it was good.

At the same time, for some reason his optimism was not shared in Washington, which led to a large-scale crisis in relations, already close to critical, between the United States and the DPRK. America even brought as many as three aircraft carrier groups to the Korean Peninsula. This, however, did not lead the stiff-necked North Korean leader to excessive compliance, and US President Donald Trump was forced to organize a meeting with him on equal terms. It took place in Singapore, where America promised to normalize relations with North Korea and take back all threats against it and plans to use force. In response to this, Pyongyang promised to stop its nuclear and missile programs and, in general, to arrange the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the future.

The compromise was reasonable and, in the long term, truly productive. After which Washington began to act in an ardent desire to realize it: it put forward a whole bunch of completely colonial demands to Pyongyang, framed them in the form of an ultimatum and, satisfied, sat down to wait for positive results. To ensure their complete reliability, he started joint maneuvers with South Korea near the borders of North Korea. I was very surprised at the “slipping” in the negotiations on Pyongyang’s disarmament. He was offended by Kim Jong-un that he did not fulfill the promises made in Singapore, because the American “president made it clear that if Kim Jong-un carries out denuclearization, then a brilliant future awaits North Korea.”

One must think that Comrade Kim also expects a brilliant future for his country, and therefore, remembering the fate of Muammar Gaddafi, continues to finance military science and attend combat tests of new types of weapons.

Kim Chen In. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

What was it?

The talkative North Korean media shared the following fundamentally important information:

After demonstrating the power of the new weapon, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un said that scientists and industrialists have done a great job, which is designed to increase the country's defense capabilities.

Kim Jong-un himself, according to the same sources, also could not resist disclosing military secrets and said that the DPRK “gives priority to the development of defense technologies and scientific developments” in the field of defense. In this boastful competition, the North Korean news agency KCNA could not resist accidentally revealing another secret: it said that the development of these weapons began under the previous leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong Il.

You can see how caps with “crabs” fly into the air at the Intelligence Agency of the US Department of Defense (DIA)…

What could it be?

Constantinople asked a number of military experts and civilian specialists on Korean issues to share their assumptions about what kind of weapons the North Koreans tested. The answer, as they say, was a little predictable. Only one of them, an academic scientist and head of the Korean studies department at one of the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, agreed to play a little guessing game with Tsargrad. Having made a reservation, however, that real information is not available to him either, so his assumptions do not mean any obligations.

The following was calculated using the elimination method.

Firstly, we proceed from the fact that Kim Jong-un announced back in the spring: the DPRK is freezing nuclear and missile tests. And he is a man of his word, at least according to the observations of Constantinople.

Secondly, everything is quite easy to track and check at the current technological level. Thus, the currently reported tests could not have been the detonation of some kind of nuclear device. And even some kind of large bomb.

Likewise, this could not have been a missile test. This is also monitored. Perhaps some "Grads" or "Smerchs" - more precisely, Korean analogues of these jet missiles. But there is no reason for broadcast statements: the DPRK has long owned multiple launch rocket systems.

Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Guns? What's new about them? Hypersound? No, this is too much. It is unlikely that North Korea possesses the necessary technologies when even the Americans cannot master them sufficiently.

As a result, after going through all the options, only one assumption remained, which is also based on the fact that North Korea has long shown interest in this area. There were also intermittent rumors that they were seriously pursuing it.

We are talking about laser weapons. Everything comes together on it. High technology and ultra-modern. No one has yet invented the tactical nature of this type of weapon - strategic lasers. Relative silence of research and perfect silence of testing. After all, in the end, a laboratory laser differs from the one placed on combat vehicles only by the power of the energy source (simply speaking, of course). Finally, the fact that they decided to demonstrate the product with its technology to the leader of the state himself (and everyone knows what this concept means in North Korea) suggests that the results of the experiments achieved the required degree of reliability and repeatability. This means that this is not something that explodes strongly and flies far (the repeatability of tests of which would have been noticed long ago by relevant observers), but something more intimate.

In addition to laser weapons, electromagnetic weapons might also be suitable for these conditions. But, if we approach it objectively, the results so far remain pitiful for Russia and the United States, which are much more scientifically and technologically advanced.

Therefore, laser?

And what, “Chairman Kim’s hyperboloid” also sounds...

New radar of South Korea. Radar with AFAR for the next generation fighter

South Korea independently created a new radar for the national fighter KF-X. The radar, designated AESA, is scheduled to be publicly unveiled on August 12. The ceremony planned for next month is especially significant as we have finally completed the development of an AESA radar that was thought impossible.

The need to develop the radar was due to Lockheed Martin's refusal to transfer the relevant technology to Seoul, although this was promised during the acquisition of the F-35A Lightning II. As a result, South Korea independently created the radar, and the Israeli company ELTA Systems helped conduct aerial tests, which started on September 26, 2020. The experimental radar was allegedly received very positively by Israeli personnel. Testing of the radar on the KF-X fighter itself is planned to begin in 2021, when the first prototype aircraft is flown into the sky.

The radar consisted of five devices. The power supply controls the radar power procedure and supplies power to the radar. The transceiver generates radar signals and performs up- and down-conversion of X-band frequencies. The antenna device transmits and receives the radar signal and performs electronic beam steering. The heat exchanger is used to cool the antenna device with coolant.

The radar processing unit controls the entire radar system and performs radar signal processing and target tracking. A snap-deception response algorithm was implemented in the internal software of the radar prototype processing unit. The radar processing unit has an OpenVPX structure. The DSP (Digital Signal Processing) unit uses the HDS6601 board from Mercury.

To confirm the algorithm's performance, a real nuclear test was conducted. The radar and test equipment were set up at the nuclear power plant test site. The distance between the radar and the simulated target and jamming signal generator is 51 m, which satisfies the far-field condition in the X-band. To create the ground simulation target, ELTA RTS (Radar Target Simulator) equipment was used. ELTA Electronic Counter Measure Test (ECMTE) equipment was used to generate a false interference signal in combination with RTS.

Before performing the radar sensing deception response test, detection tracking function and simulated target performance test were first performed to confirm the steady state of the radar under test.

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Tags: Equipment/weapons KF-X active phased array antenna AFAR Fighter F-84 radar radar radar South Korea

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Korean War

The Korean War, which lasted from June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953, was the first serious military clash between the opposing blocs of a bipolar world: the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies, on the other.

KOREA ON FIRE

The foundations for a future war were laid on August 10, 1945, when the United States and the USSR decided to divide the Korean Peninsula along the 38th parallel: the northern part was occupied by the Soviet army, the southern part by the American army. As a result, two states emerged: in the north - the pro-Soviet Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), led by the General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, Kim Il Sung, in the south - the pro-American Republic of Korea (ROK), led by Syngman Rhee. Both leaders declared their main goal to be the unification of Korea under their rule.

Without the help of the USSR and China, North Korea could not begin military operations, and Joseph Stalin agreed to carry out the operation only at the beginning of 1950, and even then after much hesitation: the main thing that worried the head of the Soviet Union was whether the United States would use nuclear weapons in this situation. weapon. By May the offensive plan was ready. In this war, two fundamentally different armies were supposed to collide: the North Korean one was trained by Soviet instructors and armed with Soviet and Chinese military equipment, while the South Korean one was trained by American military advisers.

THROW TO THE SOUTH

At 4 a.m. on June 25, General Ju Young Kang's 135,000-strong North Korean army struck the south. The armed forces of South Korea were not only inferior to the enemy in numbers (they numbered 98 thousand people), but, more importantly, they had only 27 armored vehicles against the 150 T-34 tanks of the northerners. The ROK could counter North Korea's 172 combat aircraft with only a few training aircraft.

Although the uprising of the “South Korean workers” that the communists expected did not happen, the resistance of the ROK army was quickly broken: within three days, North Korean troops took the capital of South Korea, Seoul, from where Syngman Rhee had fled the day before.

By mid-August, Joseon Inmingung (Korean People's Army) units controlled almost 90% of South Korea. The remnants of the South Korean army and the American group, which was now called the 8th Army (led by General Douglas MacArthur), which urgently received reinforcements, managed to stop the enemy on August 20 and create a 120-kilometer perimeter and a bridgehead of approximately 100 km deep. The command of the North Korean army stretched troops along the entire perimeter, scattering its forces, and all attempts to break through failed.

Read: Vietnam War: Siege of Khe Sanh

Meanwhile, reinforcements and a large amount of military equipment began to be urgently transferred to the Busan bridgehead.

On August 29, parts of the international UN contingent also began to arrive here - the first were Scots from the 1st battalion of the Argryll and Sutherland Highlanders Regiment.

COUNTEROFFENSE

By mid-September, the Busan group already had 500 tanks, more than 1,630 guns and mortars of various calibers, 1,120 aircraft, 5 South Korean and 5 American divisions, as well as a British brigade; in addition, it was supported from the sea by the powerful US 7th Fleet. While the North Korean group was superior to the enemy in terms of the number of divisions (13), it was inferior in all other positions (it had only 40 tanks and a little over 800 guns).

On September 15, the combined forces operating on the side of South Korea went on the offensive. At the same time, the Americans landed a strong assault force behind enemy lines and took the port of Inchon the next day. A group from the Daegu area attacked the landing force. On September 27, the 1st Army of the DPRK was surrounded and defeated, the 2nd Army was also defeated, but it managed to retreat to the north. On September 28, UN troops liberated Seoul and reached the 38th parallel on October 8.

Three days later they entered North Korean territory and began an attack on its capital, Pyongyang.

All attempts to stop the offensive yielded nothing. On October 19, Pyongyang fell, the remnants of the North Korean army, which had suffered huge losses, fled to the north, and Kim Il Sung moved his headquarters to Sinuiju, separated from Chinese Dandong only by the waters of the Amnokkan River.

CHINA ENTERS THE GAME

“If we allow the United States to occupy the entire Korean Peninsula... we must be prepared for them to declare war on China,” Mao Zedong told Stalin. The communist regime in North Korea was saved only by Chinese intervention.

Read: Cuban Revolution

The leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has publicly warned the UN that it will use force if the United States and its allies cross the 38th parallel. The USSR avoided direct participation in the conflict, especially since the US use of nuclear weapons was quite realistic. However, the PRC, in order to avoid any official accusations of aggression, announced that on the side of North Korea it would not be parts of the People's Liberation Army of China, but “people's volunteers” - initially 270 thousand people: in fact, soldiers of the regular army led by General Peng Dehuai.

MACARTHUR'S ERROR

On October 25, 1950, “Chinese volunteers” attacked the positions of the Americans and their allies, crushed the enemy and drove him into the mountains. However, then the advancing troops ran out of steam, and Peng Dehuai carried out a new offensive only in the second half of November. At the same time, the Chinese commander carried out a large-scale deception operation, convincing the Americans that his troops had fled. MacArthur fell for the ruse, leading his allies into the trap. The Chinese front, numbering 420 thousand people, crushed the central enemy grouping and, cutting off parts of the UN and the South Korean army, attacked the flank of the 8th American Army.

The Americans were on the verge of disaster, and it cost MacArthur his post. Only by mid-December was the advance of Chinese and North Korean troops stopped at approximately the same 38th parallel. The group of UN troops, cut off in the northeast of Korea, was able to fight back to the coast near the city of Hungnam, from where they were taken out by ships of the US 7th Fleet.

On January 4, 1951, North Korean troops entered Seoul for the second time during this war.

"SPRING ADVANCES"

On January 25, UN troops began a cautious offensive. There were no longer any breakthroughs or great successes, but they managed to successfully repel counterattacks and move forward almost non-stop - albeit slowly - until the second half of April. The enemy was pushed back across the Chania River, and Seoul was liberated again on March 15.

However, on April 22, the Chinese launched the “First Spring Offensive,” delivering the main blow on the western sector of the front. Once again, the UN troops could not stand it, and although the offensive fizzled out after a week, their losses reached 20 thousand people.

Read: Second Boer War

The “Second Spring Offensive” launched on May 16 did not have such success and was stopped five days later. After this, a group of UN troops launched a counteroffensive and cleared the territory of South Korea from the enemy: by June 10, it took up defense along a line 30 km north of the 38th parallel.

DEAD END

By June 1951, the war had reached a stalemate, and the Soviet Union took the initiative to begin peace negotiations. However, the parties were unable to reach an agreement, and the negotiations were soon interrupted. After this, the war entered a protracted stage: both sides created such powerful defense lines that it was almost impossible to take them. Offensive operations became rare, and artillery and aviation bore the brunt of the fighting; the number of troops on each side stabilized at around a million. The specificity of this last period of the war was what was called the “battle of military outposts.” The essence of these operations was that the Chinese, with the support of artillery, launched local short strikes, trying to capture dominant heights from which it was convenient to fire at enemy positions. If they succeeded, then the Americans and their allies launched counter-operations, in the vast majority of cases regaining lost positions. This led to large losses and, in general, did not bring serious results.

UNFINISHED WAR

After Stalin's death (March 5, 1953), the new Soviet leadership advocated ending the war. Without economic support from the USSR, China was unable to prolong military action. Finally, on July 27, 1953, an armistice agreement was signed, fixing the border along the 38th parallel, around which a demilitarized zone was established. A peace treaty that would formally end this war was never signed.

You might be interested:

• Wars in Asia after World War II
• How our aces beat the Americans over Korea
• Soviet-Japanese War (August 9 - September 2, 1945)
• Korean Air Force
• Defeat of the Kwantung Army
• Defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army

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