Russian intelligence officers have long been famous for their fearlessness and excellent data. Who now works in this service, how was it created and what do few people know about intelligence officers?
This structure was created in December 1920 on the initiative of the head of the Cheka, Felix Dzerzhinsky, and was called the Foreign Department. Initially, the department consisted of only seventy people.
During the first decade of its existence, the department changed its leadership several times, and in the 1930s, foreign intelligence activities were taken to a new level. It was necessary to monitor the plans of other states, since the situation on the world stage was noticeably heating up, to identify spies and obtain information about the development of science and technology abroad. There were just over a hundred employees of the Foreign Department, and in addition to legal intelligence organizations, illegal ones began to be created.
A few years later, the Foreign Department acquired number seven in the structure of the USSR State Security Directorate, and soon received number five.
In 1946, the foreign intelligence structure became part of the USSR Ministry of State Security. In 1953, the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were merged into a single department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where there was a place for the intelligence department. The year 1954 stabilized the position of intelligence - it belonged to the KGB, which lasted until 1991.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the abolition of the KGB, the Foreign Intelligence Service has been established as a separate structure.
Since 1920, the service has had nine leaders, among whom Alexander Sakharovsky held the position the longest (for 15 years), and Vyacheslav Gurgenov had the shortest leadership period (eight days).
Yakov Davtyan served as head of the department twice – first for a month, and then for four. A few years later he was shot, like many other people who held this post.
During the interval between Davtyan’s “reigns”, Ruben Katanyan held the post for four months - after which, during the time of Stalin’s repressions, he found himself in exile.
For the next seven years, from 1922 to 1929, the head of the Foreign Department at that time was Mikhail Trilisser, who was shot in 1940.
After him, from 1929 to 1931, the department was headed by Stanislav Messing, who was replaced by Arthur Artuzov (until 1935). A couple of years later, Artuzov was shot.
In 1938, with an interval of several months, five people served as head of the department. From 1938 to 1939 this position went to Vladimir Dekanozov, who was shot in 1953.
1939-1946 - during the war years, Pavel Fitin remained the head of the intelligence officers. In 1946, the position was held by Pyotr Kubatkin for several months, and then he was replaced by Pyotr Fedotov (until 1949). From 1949 to 1953, the head of the service was Sergei Savchenko.
The same situation as in 1938 arose in 1953. From 1953 to 1955, intelligence was led by Alexander Panyushkin, and Alexander Sakharovsky was able to replace him until 1955 to 1971 for fifteen years. Fyodor Mortin became his follower for three years, and from 1974 to 1988 the head of the department was Vladimir Kryuchkov.
From 1988 to 1989, intelligence was headed by Vadim Kirpichenko, and from 1989 to 1991, Leonid Shebarshin held the position. After him, the leader was Vyacheslav Gurgenov, who held the post for only eight days.
The last head of intelligence in the Soviet Union and at the same time the first head of intelligence in Russia was Yevgeny Primakov, who was the head of intelligence until 1996. 1996-2000 The Foreign Intelligence Service was under the leadership of Vyacheslav Trubnikov.
At the moment, the head of the department is Mikhail Fradkov.
What are the requirements for special forces officers?
Applicants who want to join the special forces are subject to the following requirements:
- The candidate must be between eighteen and twenty-five years of age. Older employees do not serve in special forces.
- The height of a special forces officer must be from 165 to 185 centimeters.
- A special forces employee must weigh at least 75 kilograms. The upper weight threshold should not be more than 100 kilograms.
Also, an applicant who wishes to enlist in the special forces must have no criminal record. And also unpleasant facts in the biography. In addition, the teenager’s family should not have any convicted or alcohol- or drug-dependent relatives.
The average salary for special forces employees is about fifty thousand rubles. Its growth is influenced by a huge number of factors. Titles and positions. Employees of special forces also receive bonuses for business trips.
Gas control units for cabinets
Purpose
Gas control points of the GRPSh, GRP, GRPN, UGRSh, GSGO types are used to reduce the medium and high pressure of natural gases, as well as other non-aggressive gases to the required level. It is also used to automatically maintain a given outlet pressure and turn off the gas supply in case of an emergency decrease or increases in outlet pressure. In gas control points, the process equipment is located in a metal cabinet with fire-resistant insulation (installed at the customer’s request). Gas control points are also used in gas supply systems of agricultural, industrial, public and municipal enterprises.
The conditions for using gas control points are drawn up in accordance with climatic specifications in accordance with GOST 15150:
• UHL4 at temperatures from 0 to +60ºС – production on a frame. • У1 (ХЛ1) at temperatures from -40 to +60ºС (from -60 to +60ºС) – production in a cabinet; The average service life is at least 15 years. The intended service life of the gas control point is 40 years. Briefly about the composition of gas control points.
Gas control points include the following basic equipment:
• heating system (from an external source, from a gas heater or from electric heaters in explosion-proof form); • gas filters for purifying gases from mechanical impurities; • gas pressure regulators of types RDGD, RDU-32, RDSC, RDBC1, RDG, RDNK and other regulators acceptable for use; • safety relief valves type PSK, KPS; • safety shut-off valves type KPZ, PKN; • pressure gauges for visual monitoring of the working pressure of the measured gas at the inlet and outlet; • shut-off valves; The heating system is installed at the request of the customer. Also, according to customer requirements, gas control points can be supplemented with pressure drop indicators necessary for measuring pressure drops across the filter or with a differential pressure gauge.
According to customer requirements, gas control points are manufactured:
• with one reduction line and a bypass line (bypass); • with two reduction lines (main and backup); • with two reduction lines with two outputs; • with two series-connected regulators;
According to customer requirements, you can choose the direction of location of the inlet and outlet pipes:
• with horizontal or vertical gas supply; • entrance-exit from right to left; • entrance-exit from left to right; • entrance-exit on one side;
According to customer requirements, gas control points are equipped with a set of relief valves.
Note!
Gas control points can be upgraded with a control and monitoring system, which are equipped with mobile communication devices based on the control and monitoring cabinet of the ShKU GRP in an explosion-proof form. ShKU GRP is manufactured for continuous remote control of technical parameters of gas control points using standard mobile communication channels.
Regarding the configuration of the ShKU, hydraulic fracturing units implement registration, transmission and collection of electronic signals:
• about the pressure drop across the filter; • gas contamination inside the cabinet; • from pressure and temperature sensors; • about unauthorized opening of premises and other parameters at the request of the customer.
At the customer's request, gas control points can be improved:
• differential pressure sensor to measure the pressure difference across the filter; • excess pressure sensors to control inlet and outlet pressure;
The advantage of gas control points equipped with control and monitoring cabinets is the following:
• convenient location of automation equipment inside gas control points, providing good access for maintenance; • complete supply of equipment; • remote access to the hydraulic fracturing control unit settings via mobile communication channels; • high level of automation based on a modern industrial controller; • flexibility of software and hardware configuration; • possibility of integration into existing automated process control systems; • high quality and reliability; • low cost of components;
Types of special forces
There are three main types of special forces:
- Army. Army special forces can include military personnel from the Airborne Forces, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Navy and many other structures. Army special forces specialize in reconnaissance. And also sabotage in a foreign country. Also, army special forces are sent to various types of burning spots. And also to fight terrorists on the territory of their state.
- Police special forces. It has alternative names. It is abbreviated as SOBR, OMON. Police special forces operate in major Russian cities. And it is supervised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Police special forces units may have other names.
- Strategic special forces. It is staffed by employees of the Federal Security Service. They are fighting terrorists. Just like in your own country. So it is outside the territory of your state. Bandit formations are disarmed. They specialize in freeing hostages. They also organize operations on the territory of critical infrastructure facilities. At nuclear power plants. And also at hydroelectric power plants.
What do you need to join the special forces?
To get a job in special forces, a teenager must have a number of skills. And also meet some requirements. Let's look at what skills a teenager must have to join special forces.
Experience
The only way to start working in special forces is through the army. Or serve in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the same time, it is desirable to obtain a high rank. Because only the best of the best are recruited into special forces.
It is also advisable to have a good recommendation from your previous place of service. It must be issued by the unit commander. Or the direct boss of the applicant.
The military ID must be real. Not purchased. Not a single line of his should raise doubts. Also, the teenager must be in good health. If he has any problems, he won’t fit into the special forces.
Age
To join the special forces, the applicant must be no more than twenty-five years old. Older persons cannot work in this department. Scientists believe that only during this period the body is in its best shape. Both physically and intellectually.
The special forces soldier is required to be attentive. React quickly to changing conditions. Decide quickly what to do next. In order to save the lives of both yourself and your comrades. That is why the age of a special forces soldier should be no more than twenty-five years old.
Height and weight
The applicant must have a minimum height of one hundred and sixty-five centimeters. Its weight should be from seventy-five to one hundred kilograms. The Ministry of Defense has developed the corresponding rules.
Previously, the bar for weight and height was higher. Before 2014, the technical equipment was much heavier. Therefore, at that time, larger numbers of applicants were recruited into the special forces.
At the same time, the teenager needs to understand that to work in the department it is necessary to meet the minimum height and weight. Specifically, seventy-five kilograms. And his height is about one hundred and eighty-five centimeters.
Physical training
Special forces are an elite unit. Working in this field of activity is quite difficult. As part of the profession, the teenager will have to perform physical exercises. Participate in various events. Therefore, a potential special forces employee must be strong. And also have good endurance.
It is advisable for the teenager to play sports. And had some kind of rank. It is advisable to engage in sports in combat sections. Have ranks in athletics.
Education
It is impossible to get a job in special forces without education. In addition to good physical skills, a specialist must have an education. School. As well as a diploma from a higher educational institution.
If a teenager plans to work in intelligence, then he must know several languages. At least English. It is advisable that the teenager speaks other languages.
Health
Before starting to work in special forces, a teenager will have to undergo a medical examination. It will determine whether the specialist can work in special forces. Or he is not fit to serve in this type of army.
It is noteworthy that the medical examination that is carried out to join the special forces is quite difficult. Passing it successfully is much more difficult than enlisting in the army. If a teenager has even minor health problems, he will not be accepted into the special forces.
Biography
The teenager must have no criminal record. Do not have unpleasant facts in your biography (for example, participation in any crimes). If a teenager has people in his family who have criminal records, then he may not be accepted either.
After the initial background check, the applicant must undergo a lie detector test. After this, specialists completely check the teenager’s entire life. They'll find out what he did before. Where did he work? And so on.
After this, the specialist is enlisted or not enlisted in the special forces.
Behind the scenes of the GRU
My interlocutor in the recent past is a military intelligence general who has given her more than 40 years of service.
His memory is preserved by the scorching wind of the African bush and the unbearable stuffiness of the Latin American jungle. People whose biographies are now studied in schools in different countries look at me from the photographs on the walls of his office. In them they are still very young, like the general with whom they are together in the photographs.
Behind the back of the war general are business trips, dozens of secret operations. On the ceremonial uniform are the country's awards. But he rarely takes it out of the closet. We have known each other for a long time, but the general is still bound by a vow of silence. No spy stories, names or surnames. And even having agreed to talk about perhaps the most painful topic for him - the fate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff, he did not deviate from his rules.
- How should I address you?
- Call me “Comrade Raul”, that’s what the Cubans called me many years ago... - Comrade Raul, there are many legends about the GRU. The GRU is called the most closed intelligence service in the world, the most influential and the most secretive. The abbreviation "GRU" in the West has become a symbol of the most daring Soviet covert operations. But how did it happen that such a powerful intelligence service did nothing to save its country?
— Why did the GRU miss the collapse of the Union?
— Your question is a typical mistake of those who are little familiar with the specifics of the GRU. The GRU could not in any way prevent the collapse of the Union, primarily because the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff is military intelligence, whose efforts and field of activity have always been outside the borders of the Union. On the territory of the USSR, the GRU simply did not have the right to create its own agents or conduct operational work here: all this was the exclusive prerogative of the KGB. So it would be better to forward your question there.
But I will tell you my opinion on this issue.
The KGB had its own “Achilles heel” - it was built on a territorial principle. In the territories of the republics of the USSR, most of the KGB apparatus was made up of local personnel. And if in a stable situation this gave an advantage in knowledge of the local mentality and situation, then as centrifugal processes grew, this personnel principle began to work against the Committee. A large number of employees of all ranks appeared who, some out of conviction, some out of purely pragmatic considerations, relied on supporting local separatist movements.
At the same time, the KGB leadership made erroneous decisions that only catalyzed these processes. I’m talking about attempts to take control of separatism “from within,” when instead of harshly suppressing the activities of all kinds of “popular fronts,” “deputy groups,” and “movements,” agents of the Committee began to infiltrate them with the goal of “decomposing from within.”
This type of special operations has long been known and has been practiced many times both in the USSR and in other countries, but in the conditions of political instability of the Center and Gorbachev’s two-faced treacherous policy, these operations, instead of disintegrating the “fronts,” led to the fact that these organizations began to operate practically under the guise of the KGB. The agents, with the support of their KGB handlers, climbed higher and higher up the hierarchical ladder of the “fronts,” and the “fronts” grew stronger and stronger.
As a result, the situation reached complete absurdity - by August 1991, Committee agents in some republics began to form the majority of the leadership of one or another “front”, and sometimes they simply headed it, as, for example, in Lithuania, but at the same time the “front” actually became parallel structure of power, destructuring and paralyzing the work of Soviet authorities. And this situation unambiguously testified to the depth of the processes of disintegration going on in the bowels of the once all-powerful Committee.
At the same time, the activity of the intelligence services of foreign states grew exponentially. Moreover, virtually everyone whose interests in one way or another concerned the territory of the USSR. Americans, British, Germans, French, Israelis, Turks, Japanese, Chinese, Poles - everyone who could then joined the division of the Soviet inheritance. And if in Russia they still acted with a certain caution, then in the territories of the republics the actions of foreign intelligence services became more and more open and undisguised, sometimes taking the form of direct intervention. At the same time, the republican KGB departments no longer provided any organized counteraction to this offensive. By August 1991, their activities were practically paralyzed, and immediately after the events of August their uncontrolled disintegration began. Some of the employees who remained faithful to their oath and duty were forced, fearing reprisals and persecution, to flee to Russia, some simply left the service, and others immediately went to serve those whom they had supervised only yesterday, becoming the backbone of the special services of the newly formed “democracies,” and almost immediately got involved in the fight against those to whom they had obeyed just yesterday.
- And GRU? What was happening to him?
— As I already said, the problem of the GRU at that time was that we legally did not have the right to create our own agents on the territory of the USSR and, as a result, did not have the right to conduct any illegal operations on our territory without linking them with the KGB. Accordingly, on the territory of the USSR we simply did not have any structures or units for this to effectively counter destructive processes.
The traditional “philosophy” of the GRU was that the Directorate was built to conduct reconnaissance, collect information and sabotage work beyond the borders of the Union on the territory of a potential enemy. Our intelligence departments and intelligence departments in the Union were deployed throughout peacetime states and configured to support the daily life of the troops. They did not conduct any intelligence work. Special forces units were also not tailored to the specific tasks of the special services, being instruments for waging a major war, and were deployed throughout peacetime states.
Therefore, all the information that we received from the field - and almost everywhere there were units and subdivisions of the USSR Ministry of Defense, from where we constantly received reports - we simply passed it on to the top, invariably receiving strict instructions not to interfere.
During this period, we were repeatedly reproached for the fact that the GRU did not show itself in any way. Conflicts broke out in Fergana, Baku, Karabakh, Tbilisi, Vilnius, where units of the Ministry of Defense were transferred, but often the actions of the military were similar to the actions of a bull in a china shop. Those transferred to the conflict area did not know parts of the situation on the ground; the main source of information was information received through the KGB, and it, as I already said, was often contradictory in nature, and sometimes simply inaccurate.
The situation changed dramatically by the fall of 1991, when, after the collapse of the USSR, civil wars immediately broke out in a number of republics. The process of dividing the former Soviet Army began, and entire districts and armies found themselves in the thick of dramatic events. A war began between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and civil wars broke out in Transnistria, Tajikistan, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Things have also become restless in the Russian Caucasus. All this required a change in the nature of our work. Beyond the borders of Russia, in conflict zones, our hands were freed, and we began to deploy our operational units here, which began collecting information about the situation and working with the local population. We began training personnel to work in these regions; we began to attract special forces units to cover our troops stationed in “hot spots.”
With the beginning of the “Chechen” war and the virtually complete shifting of the burden of this war onto the shoulders of the Ministry of Defense, we finally received the go-ahead for full-time work in Chechnya and the adjacent Caucasus republics. But after the completion of the military phase of the operation to restore constitutional order on the territory of Chechnya, legislative restrictions again came into force.
Understand, GRU is not a movie monster who can do whatever he wants, GRU is just a tool. Moreover, the instrument is very subtle and has a bunch of legislative and systemic restrictions. Moreover, this is a very compact instrument: the entire GRU, including the cleaners and secretaries, can be seated on one Luzhniki stand. And a lot depends on in whose hands this instrument is located and how it is used. Therefore, blaming the GRU for the collapse of the Union is the same as blaming a dagger hanging on the wall for the fact that its owner went into the forest without it and was killed there by wolves.
— Thank you for the detailed story, but after listening to it, I can’t help but ask about what is happening with the GRU now? Information about the GRU reform is fragmentary and meager and often looks more like some kind of “activities” that are thrown into society with the aim of probing public opinion. Then suddenly information comes through that the GRU is completely ceasing to operate as the main directorate of the General Staff and is being merged as a unit into the Main Operations Directorate. It is stated that all foreign intelligence of the GRU is transferred to the Foreign Intelligence Service.
“Then they take special forces brigades from the GRU, then they return them. What is happening now with the GRU? And how necessary was the reform of the GRU?
— Of course, by the end of the 90s, the GRU no longer fully met the requirements of the time, and its reform was required. The GRU had to be adapted to modern realities. In my opinion, one of the atavisms was that, being actually an intelligence service of the country equal to the SVR in scale and capabilities, the GRU did not have direct access to the top political leadership, being only one of the departments of the General Staff and being limited to the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of Defense . Such a subordinate structure was often detrimental to the cause, especially when it came to rapid response and coordination of actions with other intelligence services.
In the same USA, which it is now so fashionable for us to hold as a model, military intelligence, subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, closed to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, is at the same time part of the “US intelligence community”, which is headed by the director of national intelligence, where all intelligence information from all intelligence services flows USA, which allows you to receive more complete information and respond flexibly to threats.
It was necessary to legislatively and structurally adapt the work of the GRU on Russian territory. Reform was necessary. But it’s not for nothing that they say that the devil is in the details.
The reform was necessary, but reasonable and well calculated in its consequences. For us, everything went according to the worst-case scenario.
The main problem of the reformers is that, on the one hand, when they started the reform, they had absolutely no idea what goals it was pursuing and what results should be obtained as a result. On the other hand, they were generally extremely poorly versed in military affairs, trying to transfer to the army the principles they had previously worked out in the business sphere. In this case, a simply mechanistic approach prevailed. Without any discussion or elaboration, a directive suddenly came to reduce personnel by almost 30%. No one knows where this figure came from, how it is justified, how reasonable it is. Why exactly 30 and not 40 or 50?
The GRU is an extremely delicate and sensitive mechanism. We don’t have random people; almost everyone who serves in the GRU is, as they say, “piece goods.” These officers were selected through a special selection process, years and many millions of rubles were spent on their training. And suddenly, without any explanation or justification, we have to lay off virtually every third person in just a few months. But GRU is not a privatized plant, where, in order to increase profitability, you can simply fire every second person, dump non-core assets in the form of kindergartens, clinics, close and put on the market everything that does not generate income, and force the rest to work for two. Even in business, this scheme usually leads to only one result - squeezing all resources out of such an enterprise, and then its extinction, bankruptcy and resale of already dead land.
The analysis shows that the most effective industries are those where the reform was scientifically justified, where modernization and development took place instead of bare cuts. We had to carry out the reform, as they say, like Khrushchev’s five-year plan - “in three days.”
Unfortunately, the current leadership of the Ministry of Defense was unable to prove the fallacy of such approaches and decisions taken. To speed up the “optimization” in 2009, the leadership of the GRU, which was trying to prevent the collapse of the Directorate, was replaced. The new leadership turned out to be more accommodating, and the reform took place in the GRU in the most tragic way. Key departments were reduced to a critical minimum, some of them were completely liquidated. Thousands of officers were fired. To date, every second officer has been fired. All development and research work at the specialized research institute was stopped. We still have not recovered from this terrible blow. And the current GRU is only a faint shadow of the GRU to which I gave decades of my life.
Many of its capabilities are almost completely lost today. Today, the training of illegal agents has been completely curtailed; the faculty that trained them has been closed, the faculty that trained the apparatus of military attaches has been reduced to a critical minimum, the analytical apparatus of the GRU has been destroyed, and the transfer of foreign intelligence units to the SVR is in full swing. The reduction of teachers and professors is in full swing. From a unique strategic instrument in terms of capabilities and scale, the GRU has degraded into an amorphous secondary structure, which is most likely awaiting further “optimization.”
The level of thinking of the “reformers” is characterized by the fact that the favorite toy, on which the current Minister of Defense spares neither money nor time, is the Senezh special purpose center, which was removed from the subordination of the GRU and reassigned directly to the Chief of the General Staff. The minister personally oversees this center, equipping it with exotic foreign weapons and equipment, trying to make it into some kind of American “Delta”. The minister’s personal recreation center with a pier and yachts is also located here. Such, alas, are the ideas of the current leadership of the Ministry of Defense about the role and place of military intelligence - a hybrid of the movie “Delta” with a recreation center...
— It’s here, in Russia, in the central office. What's happening abroad? It is known that in recent years the Foreign Intelligence Service has been rocked by loud scandals: the failures of our agents in the United States, the departure of major intelligence officials to the West. It is a well-known fact that during the entire existence of the USSR there were fewer traitors and defectors than in 20 years of recent history. What's happening to military intelligence?
— The most prominent political strategist of the 20th century, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, very accurately noted in one of his works: “It is impossible to live in society and be free from society.” It is an indisputable fact: our society is seriously sick. It is corroded by corruption, organized crime, social apathy, separatism, and the ever-widening gap between rich and poor. These processes are taking place at all levels: from the Kremlin to the last village, on all social levels. And the closed order of the special services is no exception here.
To judge the state of the intelligence services, it is enough to look at the state of the most open of the security forces - the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Bribery, protectionism, clannishness, unprofessionalism - they write and talk about it. But exactly the same problems are corroding other power structures, it’s just that information about this does not reach the level of generally known.
In the special services, all this is aggravated by “specifics” - a constant state of war between them, the constant influence of the enemy, who is looking for weak links in the state security system in order to solve his problems in relation to Russia.
Intelligence today is going through a very difficult time. The main problem of today's intelligence is the erosion of motivation and beliefs, the faith without which the work of an intelligence officer is impossible. It is becoming increasingly difficult for people to explain to themselves what they are defending—their country or the interests of specific financial and political groups.
Every year, intelligence is increasingly involved in servicing and protecting the commercial interests of very specific companies and concerns. And you can prove to yourself for a long time that you are protecting the interests of Russia, acting in the interests of a bank or an oil concern, but when, due to the specifics of your work, you know where, to what accounts, the profits from the operations that you cover go, it becomes very difficult to maintain convictions and internal integrity. The scout is already constantly in a hostile environment. His will and convictions are constantly tested for strength. And when, in addition to external influence and constant tension, there is also the erosion of the once unshakable principles on which your service was built, then this can become the wedge that breaks a person’s personality and pushes a person to betrayal.
This is all aggravated by the criminal stupidity of the reformers, when ill-considered mass cuts carried out in operational units led to the fact that hundreds of officers performing tasks far from their homeland, without any explanation or reason, suddenly faced the prospect of being simply erased from life without work and a future . At the same time, many of them do not have a roof over their heads in Russia, their families are not settled. I cannot call such an attitude towards personnel anything other than a betrayal towards them. And this betrayal also provokes people into cowardice.
There is, of course, no excuse for betrayal. And no matter what the traitor’s motivation is, he will always remain a fallen soul, a pariah, an outcast.
There are no “humane” traitors who, having defected to the enemy, would not betray their country, its secrets, would not hand over those people with whom they worked, whom they knew, whose actions they heard about. For weeks and months, specialists, using the most sophisticated techniques, will “unwind” the defector’s memory, extracting from it everything more or less valuable. And only when the traitor is left with an empty container, he will receive his pieces of silver and a ticket to the Western paradise.
And behind his back, dozens of people will have to seek salvation by fleeing, and those who do not have time to escape will end up in prison for many decades, and someone will simply die from poison or a bullet. There are no exceptions. But while condemning betrayal, we must reveal its causes and understand its genesis.
- Is there really no hope? Will the GRU really go down in history as the legendary fleet of Alexander the Great, disappearing without a trace into obscurity?
“You know, I’ve lived so long that I’ve seen more than once how a bright future has become a dark past.
My fate as a scout taught me to maintain calm contemplation where you are unable to change anything, because if you succumb to despair and emotions, you will miss the moment when the situation begins to change. There is nothing finite and final on our earth, except, perhaps, the Egyptian pyramids. And the current destroyers - all these Serdyukovs and Makarovs - will not last forever. No matter how they optimize, reduce or compare the GRU to the ground, there remain those people who store its genome within themselves and who, of course, will outlive these temporary workers.
There are eternal values that do not depend on the political situation and bureaucratic tyranny. Do you remember the words of Emperor Alexander III that Russia has only two true allies - the Russian army and the Russian navy? This was said almost 150 years ago. But 100 years ago, and 50 years ago, and today, and in 50 years they will remain an axiom. Russia is impossible without a strong army and navy. And a strong army and navy are impossible without strong military intelligence - and this means that the history of the GRU is not over.
Once upon a time, my favorite writer Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, having left defeated, German-occupied France, wrote prophetic words: “Today we are defeated. And the vanquished must remain silent. Like grains..."
We are also grains today. And these grains will sprout, believe me!
Where to study for special forces?
There are no universities from which special forces officers graduate. They accept applicants who have performed well in their service. In security forces.
The easiest way to get into the special forces is to enlist. It's good to prove yourself there. Join the special forces. And then get a permanent job there. Conclude an agreement with the Ministry of Defense.
If you can’t achieve this, then you can get a job in the police. Work there for several years. And then try to transfer to special forces.
For example, a strategic detachment hires operatives from the Federal Security Service. And also from employees who showed themselves ideally in the service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
If a teenager graduates from school and plans to join the special forces, then let him begin to prepare for entering the service. Switches to a healthy diet. Actively involved in sports. And develops his physical skills. So that when the opportunity for admission arises, the teenager will have the opportunity to immediately find a job in special forces.
